




February 2020 | R2002



# Guns Out

## The Splintering of Jamaica's Gangs

---



# **Guns Out: The Splintering of Jamaica's Gangs**

**Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CAPRI)  
Kingston, Jamaica**

**This work is supported by a grant from the  
United Kingdom Department for International Development.**

**Lead Researcher: Joanna Callen**

# Table of CONTENTS

Executive Summary	
1 Introduction	6
2 Gangs, Violence & Organized Crime: Retrospect & Prospect	10
Working Definitions, Operational Realities and Discursive Trends	11
Organized Crime	16
Gang Violence	17
The Composition of Gangs	21
Politics and Gangs	22
Gangs in the Community	23
Gang Linkages to Criminal Actors Outside of Jamaica	25
Corruption and Gangs	28
Present Day Gangs in Present Day Jamaica	32
3. Successes and Failure in Dealing with Gangs	34
4. Current Approach to Gang Violence	40
Legislation	44
Prevention and Intervention	48
The Risks Associated With Anti-Gang Interventions	50
5. Analysis, Conclusion, Recommendations	50
Conclusion	52
Recommendations	55
References	56
Appendix 1	62
Methodology	62
Limitations and Challenges	62
Appendix 11	63
Sample of social interventions targeting gangs, directly and/or indirectly	63

## List of Tables & Figures

Figure 1. Gangs and Murders, 2010 – 2018	9
Figure 2. Number of Gangs	14
Figure 3. Growth in numbers of gangs	15
Figure 4. Gang-related murders	15
Figure 5. Differences in violent crime in St Andrew South pre and post SOE, 2019	43
Table 1. Number of gangs (2013)	13
Table 2. Probable causes of murder (January – mid-June, 2017)	18
Table 3. Number of gangs in Jamaica, by parish, between 2010 and 2018	36
Table 4. Seizures and Forfeitures of Ill-Gotten Money, 2014-2016	46

## Acronyms

CSJP	-	Citizen Security and Justice Programme
FID	-	Financial Investigative Division
GOJ	-	Government of Jamaica
JCF	-	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JLP	-	Jamaica Labour Party
MNS	-	Ministry of National Security
MOCA	-	Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency
NGO	-	Non-government Organization
POCA	-	Proceeds of Crime Act
PMI	-	Peace Management Initiative
PNP	-	People's National Party
SOE	-	State of Emergency
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	-	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
ZOSO	-	Zones of Special Operations



# Executive Summary

**G**angs, organized crime, and violence, and the nexus between them, are Jamaica's biggest citizen security challenge. With the second highest murder rate in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2019, Jamaica's extreme violence is often attributed to gangs. Between 2008 and 2018, gang-related violence was responsible for 56 percent of murders in Jamaica, with a high of 78 percent in 2013. Jamaica is a violent country in other ways, with extraordinarily high rates of domestic violence, including intimate partner (IPV) and gender-based violence (GBV). Jamaica's violence problem is so pernicious that the country has come to be described by academics and policy makers as having a "culture of violence."



In an effort to bring focused attention to Jamaica's gang problem, with the objective of advancing knowledge towards more effective policies and programmes for gang prevention and control, this report synthesizes what is known about:


1. The current scenario regarding gangs, violence, and organized crime in its various iterations, in Jamaica, with an emphasis on the post-2010 situation;
2. The difficulties Jamaica has had in resolving the gang problem;
3. The current strategies being employed to deal with the gang problem; and

4. The success or failure of these strategies.

Jamaica's violence problem is not new: since the mid 1970s the island's per capita murder rate has steadily increased, by an average of 4.4 percent per year, from 19.8 per 100,000 in 1977, to 60 per 100,000 in 2017. With a global average homicide rate at 6.1, even in Jamaica's more peaceful times, the country was still one of the most violent countries in the world.

Since 2011, however, Jamaica's gang situation—the context, structure, and dynamics—has changed. The May 2010 West Kingston Special Operation dislodged the country's most established organized crime entity, the Shower Posse, and was followed by an intensive crackdown targeting gang leaders, across the island. Jamaica's murder rate fell from 62 in 2009 to 36 per 100,000 in 2014. The crackdown was not sustained, nor was the decline in murder, and by 2017 Jamaica's homicide rate had risen steeply.

## Deaths as a result of gang-related violence



With the second highest murder rate in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2019, Jamaica's extreme violence is often attributed to gangs.

Jamaican gangs have since splintered: there are many more of them, and they are more loosely-organized. The number of gangs in Jamaica has since increased from 191 in 2010 to 381 in 2018, with Kingston and St. Andrew experiencing most of the increases. As the number of gangs has increased, so has the murder rate. They are well-armed, and able to virtually grow currency to purchase new, high-powered weapons. Guns are a critical aspect of Jamaica's gang problem because the majority of murders are committed with guns; between 2010 and 2018, 76 percent of murders were committed using firearms. It is thought that 97% of gang murders are committed with guns. The gangs are extremely violent, often carrying out murders where there is no material motive.

Other changes include how gangs engage in organized and transnational crime. Many gangs do engage in organized crime as regards localized extortion rackets, contract killings, robbery, and scamming. They are also engaged in cross border criminal activities, such as illegal drug trafficking where the drugs are primarily traded for arms. The links between transnational organized crime networks and Jamaica's violent gangs, however, are far more fluid and transient than once obtained, and to the extent that high level transnational organized crime is happening in Jamaica, it suits those actors better to avoid association with the violent gangs than to be involved with them.

The historical relationship between partisan politics and gangs continues to transition from direct links between patronage, gang violence and the electoral cycle, to less distinctive relationships that are speculated about, and seldom substantiated. The social dynamic between violent gangs and the communities they are based in has evolved in tandem with the relationship between gangs and tribal politics. Police corruption is a problem, largely, it is thought, in the form of police taking payment for tipping off gangsters, or directly participating in gang criminal activity. This corruption is also not well evidenced.

The state is, or ought to be, the primary actor in crime control and violence prevention, and its mandate is to control



violent crime as a basic and primary function. Since 2016, the Jamaican government has invested significantly more money into the security apparatus, a large portion of which is directly or indirectly meant to address the gang problem, via a mostly suppressive strategy that is heavy on policing. Attempts to attack the gang problem via legislation have been amplified and the Anti-Gang Act is being tested. Social interventions are essential to change the drivers and correlating factors that provide for the gangs' ongoing existence and proliferation. For them to

produce significant, measurable results, they must be evidence-based, sustained, and properly evaluated. Too many are not. That interventions might not be having desired effects at the national level, does not mean they should not be pursued; rather they should be appropriately designed, and supplied with sufficient resources, so they can yield positive changes.



Apart from policy recommendations to the Jamaican government, this report is aimed at informing and engaging civil society.

# Recommendations



1

Social interventions, done properly, are essential. The government should provide more transparency around what social interventions are being invested in, how and why those interventions have been selected, and how they are to be measured. The state needs to be held more accountable as regards social interventions, particularly by civil society.



2

Increase the scope and depth of financial investigations into criminal activity at all levels, not only financial crimes. Pursue legislative change with regard to unexplained wealth orders to put the burden of proof on the owner of the suspected asset, and to asset recovery incentive schemes, having addressed any extant constitutional constraints. Empower, expand, and support the Financial Investigation Division (FID) to make it more effective and able to conduct investigations. Proactively engage the judiciary and the police to ensure they are aware of how and why financial investigations are critical, and how they can be used in the fight against gangs. Going after the proceeds of gang organized crime is a powerful disincentive and, symbol. (It doesn't hurt that it raises revenue.)



3

Modernize the evidence threshold for criminal and other prosecution, in particular to modify the restrictions around using electronically-generated evidence (such as videos), and witnesses testifying via video link.



4

Make further and ongoing use of the plea bargain option with incarcerated or otherwise convicted potential witnesses.



5

Maintain and emphasize the distinction between crime and violence. The recently-established Violence Prevention Commission, given its mandate and membership, has the potential to put forward important evidence-based recommendations to deal specifically with the violence aspect of Jamaica's gang problem. In doing its work the Commission should keep stakeholders and the public engaged in its findings, and proposals.




6

Proceed with and engage the public on a bipartisan anti-crime consensus. This will pave the way for bipartisan agreement on policies and programmes that will not be affected by changes in political administration, and will better ensure the continuity needed for policies to have an effect. The public's engagement with the process and the resulting consensus is important for accountability and buy-in, and should be actively sought and supported.





# 1 Introduction



**Clansman gang**  
is reported to run an elaborate extortion  
racket earning  
**J\$85 million**  
a year.

The *Gleaner* cover page on November 7, 2019 featured an article on the conviction of three men who savagely murdered two women in a 2011 incident that triggered national outrage. One defendant explained in his testimony that he and his fellow perpetrators received instructions, by telephone, from “the don,” to kill the two women, shoot up a house, and then kill another person—four targets in total. He further claimed that if he didn’t participate in the killings, he himself would have been killed. Those murders appeared to have been a continuation of a series of killings that began with the killing of a 19-year-old man the day before. That young man, who was himself wanted for some 10 murders, was thought to be a key member of the Clansman gang, one of Jamaica’s most violent and powerful criminal gangs, based in Spanish Town, St. Catherine.<sup>1</sup> At the time of the 2011 murders, the Clansman gang had been in turmoil for several years, and these murders were reportedly carried out in the context of an intra-gang feud.<sup>2</sup> The

At the time of the 2011 murders, the Clansman gang had been in turmoil for several years, and these murders were reportedly carried out in the context of an intra-gang feud.

Clansman gang is one of Jamaica’s largest and most well-established criminal gangs, with an estimated 100 members.<sup>3</sup> Together with another prominent gang, One Order, Clansman gang (including its breakaway factions) is reported to run an elaborate extortion racket centered in Spanish Town,<sup>4</sup> from which it is has been reported earned some J\$85 million a year,<sup>5</sup> but which other authoritative sources have said is a significant underestimation of the group’s reve-

nues. These gangs are also implicated in contract killings in the area and beyond.<sup>6</sup>

This gruesome story, with all the attendant details, is not unusual for Jamaica, a country which suffers from an inordinately high murder rate. With the second highest in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2019.<sup>7</sup> Jamaica’s extreme violence is often attributed to gangs, such as the Clansman gang. Between 2008 and

<sup>1</sup> The definition of a gang will be considered in detail further down. Nevertheless note that any mention of gang going forward is with regard to groups whose activities are either criminal and/or violent.

<sup>2</sup> “Gruesome Crimes Take a Toll: Residents Flee: Beheading – A Signature Mark of the Murdered Clansman Member,” *Gleaner*, July 24, 2011, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110724/lead/lead7.html>; Livern Barrett, “Don wanted heads – Prosecutors release details of confessions in grisly killings as three plead guilty to non-capital murder,” *Gleaner*, November 7, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20191107/don-wanted-heads-prosecutors-re-1>

<sup>3</sup> Key stakeholder interview, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> “Internal Feud in the Clansman Gang Blamed for Upsurge in Murders,” *Loop*, February 9, 2019, [www.loopjamaica.com/content/internal-feud-clansman-1](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/internal-feud-clansman-1)

<sup>5</sup> “Clansman Gang a Family Business,” *Loop*, March 21, 2018, [www.loopjamaica.com/content/clansman-gang-family-business-say-police](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/clansman-gang-family-business-say-police)

<sup>6</sup> Key stakeholder interview, 2019; “Blackman’s Girlfriend Granted Bail, Mother Remains Behind Bars,” *Loop*, October 27, 2018, [www.loopjamaica.com/content/blackmans-girlfriend-granted-bail-mother-remains-behind-bars](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/blackmans-girlfriend-granted-bail-mother-remains-behind-bars).

<sup>7</sup> Parker Asmann and Eimhin O’Reilly, “Insight Crime’s 2019 Homicide Round-Up,” *InSight Crime*, January 28, 2019, <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/insight-crime-2019-homicide-round-up/>

Between 2008 and 2018, gang-related violence was responsible for 56 percent of murders in Jamaica, with a high of 78 percent in 2013.



2018, gang-related violence was responsible for 56 percent of murders in Jamaica,<sup>8</sup> with a high of 78 percent in 2013.<sup>9</sup> Jamaica is a violent country in other ways, with extraordinarily high rates of domestic violence,<sup>10</sup> including intimate partner (IPV) and gender-based violence (GBV).<sup>11</sup> Jamaica's violence problem is so pernicious that the country has come to be described by academics and policy makers as having a "culture of violence."<sup>12</sup>

Jamaica's violence problem is not new:

**Jamaica's violence problem is not new: since the mid 1970s the island's per capita murder rate has steadily increased, by an average of 4.4 percent per year.**

since the mid 1970s the island's per capita murder rate has steadily increased, by an average of 4.4 percent per year:<sup>13</sup> from 19.8 per 100,000 (in 1977) to 60 per 100,000 in 2017,<sup>14</sup> with a peak of 62 per 100,000 incidents in 2009.<sup>15</sup> With a global average homicide rate at 6.1, even in Jamaica's more peaceful times, the country was still one of the most violent countries in the world.<sup>16</sup> As the number of gangs has increased, so has the murder rate (see figure 1).

8 Calculated average based on data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

9 Jamaica Constabulary Force, "Gang Violence in Jamaica," correspondence with authors, October 14, 2019.

10 Domestic violence as defined by the Jamaican police encompasses all acts of violence committed against or between people who are known to one another, that does not have a criminal motive. For example, people who live together in a tenement yard who injure or maim in the course of a violent dispute.

11 Carol Watson Williams, "Women's Health Survey 2016 Jamaica," co-publication of the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2018).

12 Anthony Harriott, "Controlling Violent Crime: Models and Policy Options," The GraceKennedy Foundation Lecture 2009, [www.gracekennedy.com/images/lecture/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf](http://www.gracekennedy.com/images/lecture/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf); UNODC. 2019. Global Study on Homicide. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. [www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf); "New Year's Message 2019 by Prime Minister Andrew Holness," OPM Communications, January 4, 2019, <https://opm.gov.jm/speech/new-years-message-2019-by-prime-minister-andrew-holness/>.


13 UNODC. 2019. Global Study on Homicide. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. [www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf), 38.

14 "Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2018," Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2019; "Jamaica. The Road to Sustained Growth," World Bank, December 4, 2003, <http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/TRC/Articles/Jamaica/Sustained%20growth.pdf>, 208.

15 "Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2011," Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2012.

16 UNODC, 2019.

Figure 1. Gangs and Murders, 2010 – 2018



Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force

Despite the long-standing nature of the problem, it would appear that, given the growth and persistence of violence, effective solutions have either not been found, or those solutions that have garnered results have not been fully and properly implemented and/or sustained.

Given that improving citizen security, in particular reducing violence and murder, is the top priority for Jamaica, the obvious focus is on the gang problem. Jamaica's gangs must be considered in the extant context of poverty, social exclusion, and weak rule of law. Gang violence further intersects with criminal activity and with organized crime, including transnational organized crime, and is thought to be complicated by corruption in various forms. The social, political, and economic context, and the correlating factors of violence are constantly changing, as are the actors and motivations.

In an effort to bring focused attention to Jamaica's gang problem, with the ob-

jective of advancing knowledge towards more effective policies and programmes for gang prevention and control, this report synthesizes what is known about:

1. The current scenario regarding gangs, violence, and organized crime in its various iterations, in Jamaica, with an emphasis on the post-2010 situation;
2. The difficulties Jamaica has had in resolving the gang problem;
3. The current strategies being employed to deal with the gang problem; and
4. The success or failure of these strategies.

This information will be used to make relevant policy recommendations, with an emphasis on providing a basis on which to mobilize civic support for and participation in good governance in the area of crime and violence reduction, particularly as it pertains to gangs.<sup>17</sup>




**Jamaica's gangs must be considered in the extant context of poverty, social exclusion, and weak rule of law**

17 See appendix for methodology.





## 2 Gangs, Violence & Organized Crime: Retrospect & Prospect



In May 2010, the Kingston West Special Operation, a joint military-police operation in Tivoli Gardens, Kingston, dislodged the country's most established organized crime entity, the Shower Posse, which was also a gang.<sup>18</sup> This marked a critical juncture in Jamaica's gang and organized crime scene. Following that operation there were sustained police operations targeting major players in other gangs across the island, which led to large-scale displacement.<sup>19</sup> The number of murders in Jamaica correspondingly declined, from a high of 1,682 in 2009 to a low of 1,005 murders in 2014.<sup>20</sup> This chapter sets out the current scenario regarding gangs, violence, organized crime, and crime in Jamaica, with an emphasis on the post-2010 situation.

### Working Definitions, Operational Realities and Discursive Trends

Jamaican violent criminal gangs do not share many of the predominant characteristics of gangs in other parts of the world. They have a unique socio-political history, and display patterns of organization and behaviour that cannot be understood outside of the specific Jamaican context. For the most part, for example, they do not overtly demonstrate their

**Criminal organization means any gang, group, alliance, network that has as one of its purposes to commit crime, violence, or any other unlawful activity.**

gang status by the use of tattoos or specific colours, and many of the gangs are not the well-structured, hierarchical organizations as obtains in other areas with serious gang problems, such as Honduras or Chicago in the United States. Activities that are universal to gangs, such as crime and violence, also have to be considered in Jamaica's very specific cultural, political, and social norms that do not obtain elsewhere. Further, in Jamaica, there are significant differences between gang-like groups which include street gangs, crews, and organized crime groups, though these may overlap, which require distinctive responses.<sup>21</sup>

The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) works with a definition of gangs as developed by the Ministry of National Security (MNS) for the Suppression of Criminal Organizations Act (usually referred to as the Anti-Gang Act, or the anti-gang legislation): a criminal organization means any gang, group, alliance, network, combination or other arrangement among three or more persons, whether formally or informally organized, that has as one of its purposes to commit crime, violence, or any other unlawful activity (inter alia).<sup>22</sup> The JCF also considers gangs to include "drug traffickers, gun for drugs

<sup>18</sup> The distinction between gangs and organized criminal groups is delved into further along in the report.

<sup>19</sup> JCF, "Gang Violence in Jamaica."

<sup>20</sup> JCF Statistics and Information Management Unit, correspondence with authors, October 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Harriott and Katz (2015).

<sup>22</sup> The Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act, 2014, [https://japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/341\\_The%20Disruption%20and%20Suppression%20of%20criminal%20organizations.pdf](https://japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/341_The%20Disruption%20and%20Suppression%20of%20criminal%20organizations.pdf).

**Jamaican violent criminal gangs do not share many of the predominant characteristics of gangs in other parts of the world.**

syndicates, school gangs, and school children associated with established gangs.<sup>23</sup>

JCF further uses the generation classification system. A first generation gang is considered to have “loose leadership, limited resources, localized, opportunistic criminal activity,” and a desire to prove themselves, which can lead to virulent violent behaviour. A second generation gang is more “moderately organized,” and has “centralized and distinct leadership, expanded area of control, and engages in both licit and illicit profit oriented activities.”<sup>24</sup> The structure and organization of first and second generation gangs vary widely along these lines. In the 2019 trial of Tesha Miller, the pur-

ported don of the Clansman Gang, who was charged and convicted with being an accessory to the 2008 murder of Douglas Chambers, the main witness described the gang’s structure as containing an array of “area leaders,” “ground commanders,” and lower-level henchmen called “ground soldiers.” Ground soldiers are scouts who keep watch in the community, taking note of police and other individuals, while ground commanders take care of their underlings by providing them with money.<sup>25</sup> Clansman is an established second generation gang that was once considered a third generation, and so was likely more organized than newer gangs; such hierarchical structures are thought to have given way to more network-based

organizations.<sup>26</sup>

Both second and third generation gangs are engaged in and derive their income from murder, shooting, extortion, weapons trade, robbery, lotto scamming, car theft, drug trafficking, drugs for guns, sexual offences, warehouse break-ins, hosting of entertainment events, praedial larceny, and the scrap metal trade. The more successful gangs are thought to use the proceeds from illicit business activities to engage in and transition into legitimate businesses,<sup>27</sup> though proof of this is scant. Some of these gangs have an association with law enforcement; that is, there are corrupt JCF personnel involved, directly and indirectly, in the gang’s activ-



23 JCF, correspondence with authors, August 26, 2019.

24 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

25 Nickoy Wilson, “I killed on Tesha’s orders – witness – ex-member outlines structure of Clansman gang,” *Gleaner*, November 16, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20191116/i-killed-teshas-orders-witness-ex-member-outlines-structure-clansman>.

26 Key stakeholder interview, 2019.

27 Senior law enforcement official, personal communication, December 4, 2019; Marie Freckleton, “Is Jamaica’s Anti-Money Laundering Regime Effective?” *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 22 (1), 2019: 89-96; Senior JCF officials, group interview, October 15, 2019.

ities.<sup>28</sup>

Third generation gangs, under which transnational organized crime is included, tend to be more sophisticated transnational organizations with more of a focus on economic and political agendas,

than on violence and localized territorial disputes.<sup>29</sup> With the 2010 demise of the Shower-Presidential Click, one of the most powerful, oldest, and most resilient criminal groups in Jamaica, with links in national power circuits and global criminal networks, and entrepreneurial in a

wide range of illegal and legal activities,<sup>30</sup> the JCF considers that there are no third generation gangs in Jamaica.<sup>31</sup> JCF data did account for four third generation gangs in 2013, however.<sup>32</sup> (see table 1)

Table 1. Number of gangs (2013)

Parish	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation	Total
Kingston & St. Andrew	110	10	2	122
St. Catherine	21	1	2	24
St. James	19	0	0	19
Clarendon	15	0	0	15
St. Thomas	11	0	0	11
Westmoreland	9	1	0	10
Portland	3	7	0	10
Trelawny	7	0	0	7
Manchester	5	0	0	5
St. Elizabeth	5	0	0	5
Hanover	4	0	0	4
St. Mary	3	0	0	3
St. Ann	3	0	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>238</b>

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force, 2013. Reproduced from Harriott and Jones, 2016.

28 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

29 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

30 Harriott (2015a).

31 Senior JCF officials, interview with authors, October 2019.

32 The shift in classification may be due to a number of factors, but largely reflects the JCF’s estimation that the gangs’ structure and capabilities were diminished due to their own law enforcement efforts.






The JCF, in 2019, counted 381 gangs, all of which are first or second generation; of these 276 or 72 percent were deemed to be active, while the others were dor-

mant.<sup>33</sup> Because of ongoing fracturing and splintering within gangs, sudden and dramatic jumps in numbers of gangs can occur in a short space of time (see fig-

ure 2.) Of the dormant and active gangs, about 90 percent are considered to be first generation.<sup>34</sup>

Figure 2. Number of Gangs



Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force

Following the May 2010 Kingston West Special Operation, there was a significant displacement of gang members, and sustained state security operations targeting major players. This led to a significant reduction in the murder rate, but is thought to have also led to a splintering of existing


gangs, and the formation of newer, mostly first generation gangs. Figure 2 above shows the annual growth of the number of gangs, while figure 3 below shows that the number of gangs increased dramatically from 191 in 2010 to 381 in 2018, (see table 3 for the breakdown by parish,) and

the proportion of murders attributed to gangs also increased after 2010 (see figure 4).

33 Senior JCF personnel, 2019. The JCF deems a gang to be dormant when there has there is no evidence or intelligence regarding their involvement in criminal activities over a period of six (6) months.


34 Key stakeholder.

Figure 3. Growth in numbers of gangs



Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force

Figure 4. Gang-related murders<sup>35</sup>



Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force

35 In mid-2011, JCF went through a reclassification exercise to recategorize homicides, as it became apparent that there was a disconnect between intelligence data and official JCF statistics. The data analysis by the intelligence division revealed that over 70% of murders were gang-related. This however was not reflected in the statistical division's data analysis accounted for only 20% of homicides as gang-related. "Administration and Notifications: JCF violence attribution and assessment policy 2011," Jamaica Constabulary Force Orders, serial no.3377, February 23, 2012, <http://library.jcsc.edu.jm/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/338/Force%20Orders%203377A%20dated%202012-02-23.pdf?sequence=1>.

## Organized Crime

There is a distinction to be made between third-generation-type transnational organized crime groups, and the organized crime that second generation gangs in Jamaica engage in, such as extortion and scamming, and even drug trafficking. The link between transnational organized crime and crime carried out by violent gangs in Jamaica changed with the downfall of the Presidential Click gang in 2010. While transnational organized crime still occurs in Jamaica, largely by way of the transshipment of large quantities of illegal drugs, and large amounts of cash, through Jamaica's ports and porous borders, most of the gang-related organized crime is local to the areas that the gang controls, and tends not to be linked to drug trafficking.<sup>36</sup> Some gang-related organized crime is cross-border, for example with the aforementioned scamming, small-scale drug smuggling, firearm trafficking, and affiliations with overseas criminal syndicates, but there is more of a separation between well-established transnational organized crime and Jamaican violent criminal gangs, than once obtained.<sup>37</sup>

36 US Embassy officials, group interview, October 29, 2019.

37 US Embassy officials; Jaitman (2017), 104.

38 Jaitman (2017), 104.

39 Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Fitz Bailey, then in charge of the Counter-Terrorism and Organised Crime (CTOC) Branch, personal interview, December 7, 2018 (Bailey was promoted to Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police [ADCP] after the interview was conducted); US Embassy officials; UNDP (2012); Government of Jamaica (2014).

40 Jaitman.

41 A Galil Ace 22 rifle, registered to the Haitian National Police, was seized by the police in the midst of an East Kingston inter-gang conflict in 2017. Corey Robinson, "Rocky Life In Rockfort - Gunmen Have East Kingston PNP Stronghold Under Siege," Sunday *Gleaner*, July 23, 2017, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20170723/rocky-life-rockfort-gunmen-have-east-kingston-pnp-stronghold-under-siege>.

42 Jaitman (2017), 104.

**Some gang-related organized crime is cross-border, for example with the aforementioned scamming.**

Transnational organized crime groups are more often profit-driven, and eschew overt and obvious acts of violence, which attract the attention of law enforcement.<sup>38</sup> Those that are operating in Jamaica presently are external groups, that is, they are not Jamaican-based or operated, and they are mainly engaged in trafficking.<sup>39</sup> They operate at a high level of sophistication, and their main activities in Jamaica require intricate logistical infrastructure, and often the corruption of relevant officials. Drug trafficking does not necessarily generate violence,<sup>40</sup> and the violence created by local gangs is thought to suit them by distracting law enforcement attention away from them. The transnational crimes that the violent gangs engage in tend to be more rudimentary, such

as smuggling more portable amounts of drugs, cash, and weapons, especially between Costa Rica and Haiti, and they use violence as part of their standard operating procedure in their illicit criminal enterprise activity.<sup>41</sup> Where the transnational trafficking entities and domestic gang crime intersect may be in the former contracting the latter to carry out killings on their behalf, or where changes in the system through which drugs flow upset the balance of power between territorial groups.<sup>42</sup>

Another key difference between these two categories of cross-border crime is that transnational organized crime will more attract the attention and resources of the other countries involved, countries

which generally have more powerful and efficacious criminal justice systems. Thus the responsibility for dealing with this "lesser" organized crime rests solely on Jamaica's law enforcement and criminal justice system.

**Transnational organised crime groups are more often profit-driven, and eschew overt and obvious acts of violence, which attract the attention of law enforcement.**

43 Wood (2014).

44 Mimi Yagoub, "The Caribbean has a 'Violence Problem,' not a 'Crime Problem': Report," InSight Crime, May 23, 2017, [www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/caribbean-has-violence-problem-not-crime-problem-report/](http://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/caribbean-has-violence-problem-not-crime-problem-report/).

45 "Dual Attack. Crime and violence being treated as separate problems, police commissioner tells J'cans in diaspora," *Observer*, July 25, 2018, [http://m.jamaicaobserver.com/front-page/dual-attack-crime-and-violence-being-treated-as-separate-problems-police-commissioner-tells-j-cans-in-diaspora\\_139508?profile=160](http://m.jamaicaobserver.com/front-page/dual-attack-crime-and-violence-being-treated-as-separate-problems-police-commissioner-tells-j-cans-in-diaspora_139508?profile=160).

46 "Strategic Crime Brief to the Joint Select Committee," Parliamentary Committee (JCF-JDF) PowerPoint presentation, (regarding the Zones of Special Operations Act), June 21, 2017.

47 As one example of how this might manifest: violence between families and long-lasting family feuds can be conflated with reprisal demands that are fed by distant family members supplying money and weapons; these can and do erupt into violence even when a once-violent community is otherwise calm. Levy (2012), 31.


## Gang Violence

With a key distinction between transnational organized crime and the more localized organized crime that Jamaican gangs currently engage in being the level of violence associated with the respective criminal activities, it is the first and second generation gangs that are the main threat to citizen security and public safety. They are the principal violence producers. The currency of a gang's intergroup or intragroup enmity is violence, stemming from competition for power, domination, reputation, respect, and status, and which is a fundamental aspect of protecting territory and/or gang business.<sup>43</sup>

Another distinction is reflected in the incipient shift in the discourse in Jamaica that differentiates between crime and violence: "As some would put it, the Caribbean does not have a crime problem, it has a violence problem," given the prevalence of aggressive infractions like murder and assault over personal possession crimes, such as robbery.<sup>44</sup> The discursive shift reflects the increasingly apparent fact that gang violence does not have an apparent

criminal material motive—reprisal and informer killings as a prime example—thus a different policy response may be warranted: "The biggest predictor of violence is previous acts of violence. It doesn't operate like crime, and, therefore, the measures to deal with violence are different. Crime is largely done for economic gain, while violence is a cycle which thrives on previous acts of violence."<sup>45</sup> In 2017, 40 percent of gang-related murders were attributed to acts of revenge or reprisal, and 13% to arguments or conflict (see table 2).<sup>46</sup> This discursive trend has not yet manifested as official policy, but there is a growing acknowledgement that crime and violence should be treated as separate issues.<sup>47</sup>

The blurred lines between violence, crime, and gangs also manifest in another growing trend, where generation one and two gangs deliberately desist from violence production in order to pursue their criminal activities, so as not to attract attention, and who might thus be considered by the JCF as dormant. Their inherently violent nature may be provoked by an inter-gang dispute that threatens their



**“The biggest predictor of violence is previous acts of violence. It doesn’t operate like crime, and, therefore, the measures to deal with violence are different. Crime is largely done for economic gain, while violence is a cycle which thrives on previous acts of violence.”**

**- Jamaica’s Commissioner of Police**

commercial enterprise activity, or for any other reason.<sup>48</sup>

Jamaica’s extraordinary high impact violence situation is thought to be the result of a confluence of factors. Centuries of oppression under enslavement and colonialism, followed by decades of violent political tribalism,<sup>49</sup> augmented by the

violence associated with criminal enterprise, and fuelled by poverty, weak family structures, low quality government services, low trust in the state and its representatives, and weak social institutions. These have cemented a culture of violence that has persisted and worsened since Independence in 1962.

There are four categories of gang violence: inter-gang, intra-gang, criminal violence in direct or indirect pursuit of material gains, and violence against people who may be unrelated to the gang, but who are considered a threat, for example, witnesses or potential witnesses, and suspected informers.<sup>50</sup> The two women mentioned at the outset of this report, it

Table 2. Probable causes of murder (January – mid-June, 2017)

Probable Cause	Gang Related	Non-Gang Related	Unknown
Domestic	1	24	0
Argument/Conflict	59	73	0
Revenge/Reprisal	191	20	0
Territory/ Turf Control	97	0	0
Contract	10	4	0
Robbery	29	15	0
Drug Related	2	3	0
Lottery Scamming	9	2	0
Firearm	18	2	0
Political	0	0	0
Non-Specific	17	10	0
Not-Yet Established	38	20	27*

Source: JCF-JDF; \* Includes one mob killing for which the motive has not yet been established.

48 Key stakeholder interview; senior JCF official.

49 Political tribalism in the Jamaican context speaks to the willingness of party supporters to issue threats of violence or to commit acts of violence against rival party supporters and others, “to influence the outcome of an election, to increase or defend the support base of the party, to create exclusive electoral enclaves, to protect political boundaries against violence or perceived threats of violence, and to limit the development of independent, contestable electoral zones.” Amanda Sives, *Elections, Violence and the Democratic Process in Jamaica 1944-2007*, Kingston, Ian Randle Publishers, 2010.

50 Innocent bystanders could be considered a fifth group that is subject to gang violence.



was reported, were thought to be informers; the killing of informers is a typical example of this type of gang violence.<sup>51</sup> Witnesses and potential witnesses to gang crimes are also prime targets for murder. Witnesses may be gang members who have turned, or innocent people who have witnessed a crime, or have information pertaining to a crime, whether they have come forward with evidence or not. Inter and intra-gang violence comprise the majority of gang violence and murders. One basis for the state of emergency that was declared in the St. Andrew South police division in July, 2019, was not only that it had the largest number of gangs (of all police divisions,) but that the virulent

violence there was in large part due to over 25 gangs engaged in deadly inter and intra-gang conflicts.<sup>52</sup> Indeed the majority of gang-related murders are committed by proportionately fewer numbers of highly virulent violence producers than the number of gangs might suggest. One suggestion is that violence is concentrated in just 15 percent of gangs.<sup>53</sup>

Inter-gang violence, as the name suggests, is one gang versus another gang. These acts of violence or aggressions towards another group often stem from territorial disputes, or when one group perceives that they have been “disrespected” by another in some way. Intra-gang violence

speaks to acts of aggression that occur within a gang, rather than with external groups. Intra-gang violence can occur for a wide variety of reasons, from interpersonal differences, to power struggles, to jealousy or disagreement over the sharing of ill-gotten gains. This distinction, however, itself gets easily blurred when intra-gang conflict leads to splintering and the formation of new gangs, which then is considered inter-gang conflict.

Gang violence in pursuit of criminal gain can include murder where the motive is robbery, enforcing an extortion demand, or pursuing a scamming lead list. The 2008 murder of the managing director of

51 Even at the conclusion of the trial, where four men were convicted, it was not clear what was the motive for the women’s murder.

52 “State of Emergency – St. Andrew South Division,” JIS News, July 7, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/speeches/state-of-emergency-st-andrew-south-division/>.

53 Gang expert and academic researcher, personal communication, December 4, 2019.

the Jamaica Urban Transit Corporation (JUTC), the state transportation service for Kingston and St. Catherine, was said to have been carried out as punishment by Clansman gang members who were displeased that he was paying extortion money to another gang, One Order, in Spanish Town, rather than to them.<sup>54</sup>

**The Composition of Gangs**

Criminal gang composition in Jamaica, as in most other parts of the world, is heavily gendered: most are young males from socio-economically challenged communities. These “at-risk” young men are generally unemployed (in the formal sector), undereducated, and below the age of 35. Males, in particular young, unattached males, not only make up the majority of the murder victims but are also the primary perpetrators. This gender dynamic is reflected in the statistics: between 2012 and 2018, of Jamaica’s 8,801 murder



**4 types of gang violence**  
**Intra-gang**  
**Inter-gang**  
**Crime Related**  
**Against witnesses and suspected informers**

victims, 87 percent were adult male, 9 percent adult female, and 4 percent children.<sup>56</sup>

The role of women in criminal gang violence also bears scrutiny. Despite males being the majority of victims, women and children are victims of reprisal and retaliatory violence. A 2018 study on “Why Women Die in Jamaica” revealed that 62 percent of female victims’ deaths are gang related.<sup>57</sup> Females are also involved in criminal gangs as influencers, (women “are the ones who call the shots - they do not fire the shots,”)<sup>58</sup> and movers of weapons, among other roles, though these are not well documented. There are all female gangs in high schools, which have engaged in violent altercations.<sup>59</sup> In 2017 some nine girls, including a 14-year-old and two 15-year-olds, were arrested by the JCF for illegal possession of firearms.<sup>60</sup>

Children in gangs is increasingly a problem. The main witness against Tesha Miller in the Douglas Chamber murder trial, a self-confessed murderer, told the court that he joined the Clansman gang when he was 13 years old.<sup>61</sup> In 2017 also, 58 teenagers were arrested and charged with murder, including a 14 year-old boy.<sup>62</sup> In that same year 78 teenagers were arrested for shooting, 148 for illegal possession of firearm, and 63 for robbery with aggravation (a weapon).<sup>63</sup>

There are two primary ways that children get involved in gangs.<sup>64</sup> The first is by virtue of the fact that they come from communities with established criminal gangs.<sup>65</sup> The second is that some of these gangs position themselves near high schools in order to actively recruit school children. In 2007, 70 percent of National School Gang Survey respon-

tion (a weapon).<sup>63</sup> There are two primary ways that children get involved in gangs.<sup>64</sup> The first is by virtue of the fact that they come from communities with established criminal gangs.<sup>65</sup> The second is that some of these gangs position themselves near high schools in order to actively recruit school children. In 2007, 70 percent of National School Gang Survey respon-

dents indicated that gangs were present in their schools; 44 percent of participating principals indicated gang presence in their institutions.<sup>66</sup> In a 2017 presentation to parliament, the JCF stated that there were approximately 50 “school gangs” that have the attention of the police. Some of these school gangs are mimics of the more established criminal gangs.<sup>67</sup>

61 Nickoy Wilson, “I killed on Tesha’s orders – witness- ex-member outlines structure of Clansman gang.”

62 Corey Robinson, “ Young and Dangerous – Teenage Gangsters Driving up Crime.”

63 Corey Robinson, “ Young and dangerous – Teenage Gangsters Driving up Crime.”

64 Senior Law Enforcement Official, October 24, 2019.

65 Wyvolyn Gager, “Fourth floor: ‘shotta’ students-gangs now recruiting students straight from the classroom,” *Gleaner*, April 24, 2017, <https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20170424/fourth-floor-shotta-students-gangs-now-recruiting-members-straight>.

66 Glaister Leslie, “Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Report 26, 2010, [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf).

67 Michael Gordon, Criminologist and Lecturer at The University of the West Indies Mona, interview with authors October 15, 2019.

54 “Tesha Miller goes on trial October 28,” *Observer*, April 25, 2019, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/tesha-miller-goes-on-trial-october-28\\_163111?profile=0](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/tesha-miller-goes-on-trial-october-28_163111?profile=0).

55 Harriot and Jones (2016).


56 CAPRI (2019a).

57 Paul Clarke, “Women Are Triggers in Gang Violence, Study Shows,” *Gleaner*, May 23, 2018. <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180523/women-are-triggers-gang-violence-study-shows>


58 Edmond Campbell, “Women Gangsters?” *Gleaner*, October 13, 2013, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20131013/lead/lead72.html>.

59 Ryon Jones, “Girl Gangsters BOOTED,” *Gleaner*, May 24, 2015, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20150524/girl-gangsters-booted>.

60 Corey Robinson, “ Young & Dangerous – Teenage Gangsters Driving up Crime,” *Gleaner*, January 21, 2018, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180121/young-dangerous-teenage-gangsters-driving-crime-rate>.



8,801 murders, 2012 - 2018



## Politics and Gangs

In most, if not all, violent communities throughout Jamaica, what we today call “gang warfare”—specifically extreme violence, violent crime, and murder, carried out by a relatively small number of highly active offenders—is the direct descendant of organized partisan political violence that originated in the heated electoral disputes of the late 1940s. The division of neighbourhoods according to political allegiance resulted in party supporters agglomerating in geographi-

cally specific locales. Politicians depended on enforcers (or “dons”) in inner-city areas to ensure party loyalty and deliver votes; in return the politicians provided patronage in the form of jobs via public works programmes, overseas agricultural employment contracts, cash, food, and housing.<sup>69</sup> To strengthen enforcement capabilities, guns were provided by politicians, and their use was either tacitly or overtly encouraged. This resulted in close ties between groups of high-impact violent offenders (what would come to be called gangs) and politicians in the 1970s

and 80s, and gang warfare and murder were motivated by tribal politics.<sup>70</sup>

The nature of armed violence and the context of high murder rates in Jamaica has, however, changed. Political violence has diminished significantly since the mid-1990s, and while many gangs maintain political affiliations, since the 2000s there have been few instances of violence and murder that can be or have been directly linked to partisan politics. New gangs have emerged that are not connected to politics or political patron-

age, though they may be identified with the dominant party in their community. They have their own sources of weapons, usually financed with the proceeds of their criminal activity. Older gangs still maintain their early political affiliations; for example, Clansman and One Order are openly aligned to the PNP and JLP, respectively. The current scenario, however, is that many gangs have bridged political divides, reconciled their differences, and are promoting networking through relationships of convenience.<sup>71</sup>

Nevertheless, there continue to be assertions that suggest that party-gang linkages do persist. In June 2019 a sitting member of parliament accused his fellow MPs of “using gangs as election tools,”<sup>72</sup> and in October 2019, a bipartisan anti-crime summit was held, one outcome of which was a commitment from the prime minister and the leader of the opposition to “publicly repudiate links between politics and gangs.”<sup>73</sup> These assertions suggest that the original politics-gang linkages do persist at least to some extent, though they may not be as ubiquitous as they once were. At the same time, there are strong suggestions that corrupt relationships endure. For example, a number of key stakeholders interviewed for this study stated their firm knowledge of politicians who provide protection to gangs. (We explore corruption and gangs further down.)

## Gangs in the Community

The state is, or ought to be, the primary actor in crime control and violence prevention, and its mandate is to control violent crime as a basic and primary function. The state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the provision of security are seen as the most important features of a functioning state,<sup>74</sup> and are

What we today call “gang warfare”—specifically extreme violence, violent crime, and murder—is carried out by a relatively small number of highly active offenders.

normally carried out by the police, and in some places and situations, the army.<sup>75</sup> In reality, however, the state may be unwilling or unable to be the only provider for policing functions,<sup>76</sup> and non-state actors fill the void; the result is a “hybrid” situation where state and non-state actors perform security and policing activities, and exert violence control.<sup>77</sup>

In the Jamaican context, violent criminal gangs commonly assume a policing role within their domains; the order they enforce is one that suits them rather than is aligned with national laws. Powerful gangs that successfully enforce order within their domains may come to enjoy legitimacy among the members of that community due to their efficient provision of a certain security and stability, and the provision of needed material goods to

those community members, particularly where the state has failed or is absent.<sup>78</sup> The more established violent criminal gangs are also associated with “community justice” or “jungle justice,” terms for the punishment, usually swift, of community members deemed by the respective don to be guilty of offences such as rape or robbery. The culprits would then be subjected to being beaten (sometimes savagely, resulting in injuries such as broken bones), tortured (for example with electrical shocks), or killed.<sup>79</sup>

The social dynamic between violent gangs and the communities they are based in has evolved in tandem with the relationship between gangs and tribal politics. The gangs were often conduits for state resources into the communities, and as the politics-gang violence rela-

Children in gangs is increasingly a problem.

69 Harriott (2000); Jaffe (2012).

70 This origin story of Jamaica’s violent crime problem is widely accepted as a given, and is the basis for most if not all assessments and understanding of the issue.

71 Key stakeholder interview, 2019.

72 Balford Henry, “Warmington accuses colleague MPs of using gangs as election tools,” *Observer*, June 26, 2019, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/warmington-accuses-colleague-mps-of-using-gangs-as-election-tools\\_168409](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/warmington-accuses-colleague-mps-of-using-gangs-as-election-tools_168409).

73 “Holness, Phillips to publicly repudiate link between politics and gangs,” *Observer*, October 18, 2019, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Holness,\\_Phillips\\_to\\_publicly\\_repudiate\\_link\\_between\\_politics\\_and\\_gangs](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Holness,_Phillips_to_publicly_repudiate_link_between_politics_and_gangs).

74 This is considered the “common governance point of view.” Weber (1968); Boerzel and Risse (2010).

75 Rotberg (2003).

76 Policing is “any organised activity, whether by the state or non-state groups, that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security, and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment.” Baker (2008).

77 A hybrid state is one where both state and non-state actors perform security and policing activities, and exert violence control. Volker Boege, *On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States. States Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’*. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008, [www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/ Handbook /Articles/boege\\_et\\_al\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/ Handbook /Articles/boege_et_al_handbook.pdf).

78 Jaffe (2012); Harriott (2009). The earlier reference to “jungle justice” or “community justice” pertains here.

79 Mogensen (2005); Levy (2001, 2009, 2012); Jaffe (2013).

tionship shifted, the gangs often retained their positions of power in the communities, but now funnel resources obtained through crime.<sup>80</sup> Weak social control and failure of the government to provide adequate social services for these marginalized communities further allowed for criminal actors to step into the vacuum.<sup>81</sup> These criminal actors provide everything

from “education, public health, and employment,” to “traditional security,”<sup>82</sup> all of which furthers the embeddedness, leverage, legitimacy, and power of criminal groups in communities, one effect of which is the reluctance of community members to provide the police with information on these groups. This has been seen clearly, and recently, in the support

that communities provide for persons engaged in scamming because of the money they put back into the community.<sup>83</sup> The criminal groups’ legitimacy also contributes to luring youths into their fold.

80 Leslie (2010).

81 Leslie (2010); Manwaring (2012), 25.

82 Manwaring, 25; Katz (2015).

83 CAPRI (2019b).

Powerful gangs that successfully enforce order within their domains may come to enjoy legitimacy among the members of that community due to their efficient provision of a certain security and stability.

#### Gang Linkages to Criminal Actors Outside of Jamaica

There are transnational networks between gangs located in Jamaica and criminal organizations of varying sorts and sizes in the United States U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom. While there is not a great deal of recent research or evidence on these linkages, there is some knowledge about the nature of some of them. The older, more established gangs have established affiliates from the time when drug trafficking was the principal gang criminal activity.<sup>84</sup> Gangs today, even the less organized ones, might have an overseas base, and/or a contact through whom they procure weapons. Tesha Miller, leader of the Clansman gang, was arrested several times in the U.S. in the 2000s, and was known to be ordering murders in Jamaica from the U.S.; he is thought to have had some sort of base there, from which he operated.<sup>85</sup>

The Canadian authorities consider that, even though they lack the hard evidence, there is a significant movement of criminals back and forth between Canada and Jamaica, there are strong roots and connections between gangs in both plac-

es, and transnational organized crime is active and the links between organized crime in North America and Jamaica are active.<sup>86</sup> The basis of these linkages is illicit drugs, in particular cocaine, but also heroin and other substances. After the Shower Posse was disrupted in a two-year anti-gang campaign in Toronto after 2010, homicide rates fell to a 25-year low.<sup>87</sup> While the authorities consider that gang’s influence as having diminished, the networks are still in place, illicit drugs are still being moved, and the connections are still there.<sup>88</sup>

The Canadian example demonstrates one type of linkage, where Jamaican gangs leverage diaspora connections to carry out criminal activities, particularly transnational drug trafficking networks, where they use brokers on the ground there to conduct business.<sup>89</sup> These linkages also work in the other direction, where gangs are led and/or financed by gang members overseas, in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.<sup>90</sup> Instructions, money, and weapons are passed to someone on the ground in Jamaica, who carries out whatever directives are issued. For example, in mid-2018 the police attributed many murders in August Town, a vola-



tile community with 11 gangs and corner crews, to the offer of cash payments from US-based allies of a slain Bedward Gardens gang member. They offered a reward (said to be US\$10,000) to anyone, regardless of gang affiliation, for the killing of anyone from Jungle 12; a Jungle 12 gangster having committed the murder for which they were seeking reprisal.<sup>91</sup> A somewhat similar relationship appears to

84 A report on Jamaican organized crime groups in Canada described linkages between the Shower Posse and two Canadian gangs that supplied drugs and weapons to, and exerted some measure of control over Canadian street gangs. The Shower Posse, the Canadian authorities came to conclude, had been operating in Canada for decades, and was responsible for a significant part of the city’s drug trade. Burt et al (2016), 14.

85 US Embassy officials’; Senior Law Enforcement Officials.

86 Burt et al (2016), 15.

87 Burt et al (2016), 16.

88 Burt et al (2016), 16.

89 Burt et al (2016), 12.

90 Black (2004), 125.

91 Corey Robinson, “Lust For Blood! - Overseas-Based Gangsters Fuelling The Murders In August Town,” Sunday *Gleaner*, September 23, 2018, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180923/lust-blood-overseas-based-gangsters-fuelling-murders-august-town>; Alicia Barrett, “Don wants 100 killed for son’s murder,” Star, March 21, 2018, <http://jamaica-star.com/article/news/20180321/don-wants-100-killed-sons-murder>.



have existed between the UK and Jamaica, when two former leaders of the British Link-Up Crew, an English drug smuggling gang, were assassinated in Jamaica, in what appeared to be a purge directed from the UK.<sup>92</sup>

What is perhaps a more significant—in terms of understanding and resolving virulent gang violence in Jamaica—set of cross border linkages is amongst Jamaica, Costa Rica and Haiti,<sup>93</sup> whereby guns, cash, drugs, and people move back and forth.<sup>94</sup> There is a nexus between Jamaican marijuana, Colombian cocaine, Haiti's illegal gun supply, and the north coast of Costa Rica, facilitated by the ease of movement between Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Haiti, and Jamaica's porous coastline. This nexus is a key element of understanding how Jamaican gangs sup-

ply themselves with the weaponry that undergirds the prevalence of virulent violence in Jamaica.

Jamaica is the largest Caribbean source country of marijuana; ganja production has increased since the decriminalization of marijuana in Jamaica in 2015, and the pausing of the eradication programme that had been in operation since 1974. Criminals (whether affiliated with established gangs or not) use Jamaican marijuana to buy weapons and cocaine.<sup>95</sup>

Costa Rica is a key transit point for Colombian cocaine.<sup>96</sup> Jamaica is also a key transit point for cocaine trafficked from South America to North America and other international markets. Colombia's cocaine production is at the highest level in history, due to socio-political factors

within Colombia itself, as well as technological innovations that have improved yields, so the supply has increased and the price has fallen.<sup>97</sup> The JCF recorded, in 2019, the highest seizure of cocaine since 2004,<sup>98</sup> (the year which coincides with the inception of Operation Kingfish.)<sup>99</sup>

There are two categories of transshipped cocaine. The first is bulk amounts that are transshipped in highly sophisticated operations involving Colombian traffickers and their local counterparts, who are not members of gangs, though they may be associated with them as they may use their services for protection, or for contract killings. The Colombians eschew violence as it attracts attention that jeopardizes the enterprise. This enterprise often engages corrupt government personnel, for example customs and port

92 Erica Virtue, "Execution-style killing in New Kingston—one victim rushed to hospital; cops probe British Link Up connection," *Gleaner*, April 7, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20190407/execution-style-killing-knutsford-express-one-victim-rushed-hospital>.

93 These three countries primarily, although other Central American countries and Caribbean islands do come into play.

94 Adrian Frater, "Gangsters fleeing to Haiti, Costa Rica – police – Mobay Most Wanted Believed Murdered Overseas," *Gleaner*, October 17, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20191017/gangsters-fleeing-haiti-costa-rica-police-mobay-most-wanted-believed>.

95 US Embassy officials; Tauna Thomas, "Police make more than 500 arrests for drug trafficking this year," *Nationwide News*, September 9, 2019, <http://nationwideradiojm.com/police-make-more-than-500-arrests-for-drug-trafficking-this-year/>.

96 Seth Robbins, "Costa Rica's Port of Limón Feeds European Cocaine Pipeline," *Insight Crime*, March 12, 2019, [www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/port-in-costa-rica-feeds-european-drug-pipeline/](http://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/port-in-costa-rica-feeds-european-drug-pipeline/).


97 "World Drug Report 2019. Global Overview of Drug Demand and Supply," United Nations Office of Drug Control, [https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19\\_Booklet\\_2\\_DRUG\\_DEMAND.pdf](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_2_DRUG_DEMAND.pdf).

98 Tauna Thomas, "Police make more than 500 arrests for drug trafficking this year."

99 Operation Kingfish was a multi-lateral law enforcement joint task force that operated between 2004 and 2012, that sought to dismantle the illegal international drug trade that was a primary basis of violent gang activity in Jamaica.



## Jamaican gangs leverage diaspora connections to carry out criminal activities, particularly transnational drug trafficking networks, where they use brokers on the ground there to conduct business.



officials.<sup>100</sup> The other category is smaller amounts that are exported in small quantities using smuggling techniques such as concealing it in food packaging; it is this aspect of the cocaine trade that the violent Jamaican gangs tend to be involved in. (Very little from either category is consumed in Jamaica; it is estimated that 95 percent of the cocaine that enters the island leaves.)<sup>101</sup>

Haiti is "awash in illegal weapons," with an estimated 500,000 illegal guns in circulation,<sup>102</sup> and is a principal seller of the arms that enter Jamaica, and that are used by Jamaican gangs.<sup>103</sup> There are 145 uncontrolled ports of entry along Jamaica's

shoreline, through which, it has been reported, 2,400 guns enter the country illegally each year (annual gun seizures represent about a third of that number.)<sup>104</sup> Guns are a significant factor in the gang violence problem. Haiti is also a major transit point for marijuana originating out of Jamaica.<sup>105</sup>

There is a cocaine-for-marijuana trade directly between Jamaica and Costa Rica, where the Jamaican marijuana supplies the Costa Rican domestic market,<sup>106</sup> and Colombian cocaine is transshipped out of Jamaica, or used to buy guns in Haiti. A February 2020 investigative news story reported that "deep-pocketed business-

men and gang members from Kingston, St Catherine, and St James sponsor expeditions from Jamaica to Haiti, where thousands of pounds of marijuana are traded for rifles and handguns: "30 pounds of weed usually swaps for one rifle, and 10 pounds for a handgun; a kilo of coke normally swaps for three rifles."<sup>107</sup> Jamaican marijuana is thus, quite literally, used as currency. It is traded for cocaine that is on sold for cash, and it is traded for weapons. The trade in guns in exchange for illicit drugs exacerbates the violence problem as large numbers of weapons, including expensive, high tech guns, flow freely into the country.<sup>108</sup>

100 Key stakeholder interview, October 2019 a.

101 US Embassy officials.

102 Taylor Dolven and Jacqueline Charles, "Haiti is awash in illegal guns. Could U.S. policy be to blame?" *Miami Herald*, November 14, 2019, [www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article237335964.html](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-cruises/article237335964.html).

103 Lavern Barrett, "Massive Gun Find - Police Seize Huge Haiti Arms Shipment Destined For Jamaica," *Gleaner*, October 6 2016, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20161006/massive-gun-find-police-seize-huge-haiti-arms-shipment-destined>.

104 "Fishing For Guns - Old Harbour Bay Boatmen Rake in Profits With Drugs-For-Arms Trafficking to Haiti," *Gleaner*, February 10, 2020, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20200210/fishing-guns-old-harbour-bay-boatmen-rake-profits-drugs-arms>.

105 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1 Drug and chemical control," United States Department of State, March 2019, [www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/INCSR-Vol.-I-1.pdf](http://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/INCSR-Vol.-I-1.pdf).

106 US Embassy officials.

107 "Fishing For Guns - Old Harbour Bay Boatmen Rake in Profits."

Violence is also transmitted across these borders. In 2018, for example, a top-tier member of a St James-based gang, who was on the radar of the police, fled to Costa Rica, where he was fatally shot, in the midst of a feud which was initiated in Montego Bay.<sup>109</sup> This scenario is not new: in 2009 the Immigration Administration in Costa Rica announced new entry restrictions as a direct result of major crimes allegedly committed by thugs from Jamaica.<sup>110</sup>

Guns are such a critical aspect of Jamaica's gang problem because the vast majority of murders are committed with guns; between 2010 and 2018, 76 percent of murders were committed using firearms. It is thought that 97% of gang murders

are committed with guns.<sup>111</sup> In 2018 there were an estimated 200,000 illegal firearms in the possession of civilians in Jamaica,<sup>112</sup> while the Jamaica Constabulary Force had 12,000 weapons in their arsenal,<sup>113</sup> and the Jamaica Defence Force had 8,681 registered firearms.<sup>114</sup> Among these are high calibre weapons: an intercepted cache of weapons seized in early 2019 included an Uzi submachine gun, a high-powered sniper rifle complete with a tripod, an AK-47, and M-16 assault rifles, among other semi-automatic guns.<sup>115</sup>

#### Corruption and Gangs

Corruption, broadly speaking, is widely considered a barrier to the country's development by key domestic and international stakeholders.<sup>116</sup> Corruption with

regard to any type of crime in Jamaica is not well evidenced, and is difficult to document. In 2017 there were 1,844 cases of corruption brought before the parish courts, with 519 convictions. However, over a seven year period, there were only seven convictions for illicit enrichment, where someone has assets and a lifestyle that are inconsistent with the person's known sources of income.<sup>117</sup>

Corruption in all aspects of government has always been alleged and assumed—the administration in office at the time of writing had two resignations of Cabinet ministers in the space of one year, due to allegations of corruption. In large part, however, there is seldom any substantiation of specific allegations and proven

108 UNDP (2012), 77.

109 "War Anywhere – Mobay Gangsters Take Their Deadly Feud to Costa Rica," *Gleaner*, May 27, 2018, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180527/war-anywhere-mobay-gangsters-take-their-deadly-feud-costa-rica>.

110 "War Anywhere – Mobay Gangsters Take Their Deadly Feud to Costa Rica."

111 Senior JCF official.

112 Aaron Karp, "Estimating Global Civilian-Held Firearms Numbers," Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper, June 2018, [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf).

113 Aaron Karp, "Law Enforcement Firearms Holdings, 2017," Estimating Global Law Enforcement Firearms Numbers, 2018, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

114 Aaron Karp, "Military Firearms Holdings, 2017," Estimating Global Military-Owned Firearms Numbers, Small Arms Survey, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

115 Guns are not the only high technology equipment used in violent gang crime. From as early as 2008, police have also discovered that some criminals are also using night vision goggles; JCF also discovered the use of night vision goggles in the 2010 Tivoli operation. "Nicaraguan held in police operation," *RJR News*, April 5, 2008, <http://rjrnews.com/local/nicaraguan-held-in-police-operation>; Livern Barrett, "Tivoli was armed for war," *Gleaner*, February 20, 2015, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20150220/tivoli-was-armed-war>; "Major guns, ammo seizure at Port Bustamante in Kingston," *RJR News*, February 26, 2019, <http://rjrnews.com/local/major-guns-ammo-seizure-at-port-bustamante-in-kingston>.


116 "No Impunity For Corruption - International Partners Keeping Eye on Jamaica, Warn of Need For More Prosecutions of Prominent Politicians, Business People," *Sunday Gleaner*, February 9, 2020, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20200209/no-impunity-corruption-international-partners-keeping-eye-jamaica-warn>; Romario Scott, "This Is Not About Enriching Yourself - Holness Warns Labourite Reps Against Corruption, Arrogance," *Gleaner*, February 10, 2020, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20200210/not-about-enriching-yourself-holness-warns-labourite-reps-against>.

117 Trevor Munroe, "Advancing In The Justice System; Lagging In Control Of Corruption,"

*Gleaner*, June 23, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/commentary/20190623/trevor-munroe-advancing-justice-system-lagging-control-corruption>.



## 145 uncontrolled ports of entry along Jamaica's shoreline



through which  
**2,400 guns**  
enter the country illegally each year

cases. Even after official investigations into specific cases, very little gets unearthed to substantiate allegations. What appears to be clear cut cases of public officials embezzling public resources, with an abundance of incriminating evidence, end without a conviction. That these crimes that seem to be so hidden in plain sight go unaddressed, uninvestigated, and unprosecuted is a result of many variables. The difficulty with coming up with evidence is just one factor. In corruption scenarios where everyone is benefitting, it is rare that there will be a whistle blower. The rumours are, however, too persistent, and the statements made in private by reliable persons too frequent, to ignore the allegations.<sup>118</sup>

The dearth of evidence also pertains to gangs and corruption. Corruption is often cited as a barrier to solving aspects

of the gang problem, and for some, the gang problem as a whole. The UNDP has stated that "the corruptive influence of gangs and organized crime also leads to decreased economic performance."<sup>119</sup> But evidence of that corruption is difficult to obtain, and so the problem largely remains conceptual, with little material basis to act on.

There are four main sites that corruption as it relates to criminal gangs is thought to occur: the police, the justice system, political representatives, and private businesses.

Corruption is widely acknowledged as endemic to the JCF, with its history of criminal ties and extrajudicial killings;<sup>120</sup> many, if not most, Jamaicans view the JCF as corrupt.<sup>121</sup> In so far as it is associated with violent criminal gangs, it is

thought that there are problems with collusion.<sup>122</sup> This collusion can take various forms, such as being paid by the gang to give information regarding law enforcement activities related to them, or even carrying out gang-related killings. For example, the Uchence Wilson Gang, which went on trial in 2018, counted two policemen among those who went before the court.<sup>123</sup> Corruption, especially in the police, is also blamed for the perceived failure to bring the guilty to justice.<sup>124</sup>

Apart from direct corrupt relationships between violent criminal gangs and police, there are fundamental deficiencies in the JCF that preclude the efficacy or success of any anti-crime initiative in general, and anti-gang effort in particular. One significant aspect of the police problem in Jamaica regards the trust deficit between the police and the citizenry, including the

118 Lloyd Barnett, Jamaican legal scholar, cited in CAPRI (2007).

119 UNDP (2012), 79.

120 "Jamaica Country Profile," International Security Sector Advisory Team, Geneva Center for Security Governance, February 2, 2015, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Jamaica-Country-Profile>.

121 One survey found that 81% of the persons interviewed believed that the police force was either corrupt, very corrupt, or somewhat corrupt. CAPRI (2007). Corruption is an issue all law enforcement agencies around the world struggle with.

122 Darby (2006) cited in UNODC & World Bank (2007), 111.

123 "Uchence Gang Trial: Prosecution Witness to Testify via Video Link," *Loop*, March 5, 2019. [www.loopjamaica.com/content/uchence-gang-trial-prosecution-witness-testify-video-link](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/uchence-gang-trial-prosecution-witness-testify-video-link).

124 UNODC and World Bank (2007).

125 Ian Boyne, "Police-Citizen Relations Key to Crime Fighting," *Gleaner*, January 5, 2014, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20140105/focus/focus2.html>.

gap between police and civil society,<sup>125</sup> and the ways this deficit undermines the state's efforts to address crime (of whatever sort). For Jamaica's poorer citizens, such as those in vulnerable, gang-plagued communities, poor service (unresponsiveness, absence, corruption) and violence (police killings, brutality) tend to characterize their relationship with the police.<sup>126</sup> Thus where the police are obvious key actors in the state security apparatus' work to prevent and tamp down violence, the poor police-citizen relationship sets citizens against the police, mitigates the effectiveness of their work, and hampers investigations as witnesses will not come forward.<sup>127</sup>

Any significant lowering of the rates of homicide and other violent crimes, and any meaningful weakening of criminal networks, including gangs, requires a thorough transformation of the JCF, to bring the force more in line with democratic policing principles and methods of work, and make it more effective as an instrument of crime prevention and control.<sup>128</sup>

The Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) was established as an elite and independent agency to focus on corruption which hinders good governance and transnational organized crime. MOCA focuses on what are considered to be the more organized gangs, which by 2019 numbered five to six. Their role is to gather intelligence and conduct investigations towards building a case. MOCA's work involves extensive collaboration with other state agencies, in particular the JCF Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime division, which contains the National Strategic Anti-Gang Unit, and the FID. MOCA's approach is to separate gangs into two groups: violent criminal gangs, and transnational syndicates; their work is more focused on the latter. (Though the JCF considers transnational syndicates as third gener-



## 54% of Jamaicans think that "politically connected criminals" go free

ation gangs, and has considered there to be no third generation gangs in Jamaica for nearly a decade, MOCA nevertheless considers there are such groups.)

Though violent criminal gangs generally do not fall under MOCA's purview, the high-level, or "white collar" criminal entrepreneurs that they do pursue often have corrupt connections to both law enforcement and violent inner city groups. In some instances these links are for their (the criminal mastermind's) protection, in others that mastermind may have graduated out of a violent criminal gang. Even when investigators think they have cogent evidence of these connections, however, there is a very high threshold for commencing prosecution, and the prosecutors will advise that the available evidence does not meet that threshold.<sup>129</sup> The evidence threshold challenge affects most entities whose work involves eradicating gangs and gang activity.

With regard to the judicial process, it has been averred that organized crime can have a substantial impact on the rule of law through the inefficiency and corruption of the judicial sector.<sup>130</sup> A 2010 survey found that 36 percent of Jamaicans

perceived that judges are corrupt, and 57 percent considered the justice system corrupt.<sup>131</sup> The then-Minister of Justice admitted in 2011 that the justice system was plagued by corruption.<sup>132</sup> One Jamaican newspaper columnist referred to corruption in the justice system as, "If you have enough funds and the right contact, your files can magically disappear."<sup>133</sup>

Corruption as it relates to the involvement, direct or indirect, of the political directorate with criminal elements is widely perceived. Fifty-eight percent of Jamaicans think that "politically connected criminals" go free.<sup>134</sup> There are many allegations made off the record, by people with access to such information, or who claim direct knowledge of specific instances, of, say, a politician giving cover to a known criminal, to discard them for lack of concrete evidence.

More substantively, there is the well-documented historical relationship that was detailed earlier. That entailed significant corruption, as politicians used gang structures to control electoral violence and marshal votes, in return for which they delivered economic rents to gang leaders in the form of protection and access to



government contracts, and allowed gangs to deliver public goods to the communities they control.<sup>135</sup> These may have endured in some realms; GOJ's own national security policy (written in 2013) states as an area of concern, "the placing of public works contracts with organizations that are fronts for organized crime."<sup>136</sup> (The ultimate connection between gangs and the political directorate in Jamaica was that between one of Jamaica's most successful transnational organized crime groups, Presidential Click, and the Jamaica Labour Party, which came to a head in

2010 when the JLP was in power and refused to sign a US extradition request for Presidential Click's principal.)

Corruption between gangs and established businessmen, and people in the legal profession, is also difficult to substantiate, as was detailed in the above discussion of MOCA. Many key stakeholders state, with confidence, that corruption as it regards links between gangs and influential people in the society exists. There is a notion that the "washed" criminals of the 1970s to the 1990s have tran-

sitioned into the legitimate economy and the upper middle class.<sup>137</sup> While there is some speculation that "crooked bankers and financial industry interests launder [drug] money and facilitate criminal enterprises, and real estate brokers sell desired land to the newly rich criminals (cash only), no questions asked,"<sup>138</sup> most key stakeholders interviewed stated that even when gangsters do very well (make a lot of money,) they seldom enter the formal economy.

136 Government of Jamaica (2014).

137 Mark Wignall, "If SOE is Not It, What Then?"

138 Mark Wignall.



In 2017 there were

# 1,844 cases of corruption

brought before the parish courts, with  
**519 convictions**

128 CAPRI (2018).

129 Senior FID official, personal interview, November 28, 2019.

130 UNDP (2012), 78; "Jamaica Country Profile."

131 UNDP (2012), 78.

132 "Jamaica Country Profile."

133 Mark Wignall, "If SOE is Not It, What Then?" Sunday *Gleaner*, November 3, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/focus/20191103/mark-wignall-if-soe-not-it-what-then>.

134 UNDP (2012), 78.

135 Burt et al (2016), 12.

**The post-Dudus era features a proliferation of gangs that are much more loosely organized, are spread out throughout the island, and, for a variety of reasons, are considerably more violent.**

#### **Present Day Gangs in Present Day Jamaica**

The stage for Jamaica's present-day gang problem has thus been set. In the "post-Dudus" era, since 2010-1, contextual variables and drivers of gang crime and gang violence have changed. Where there was formerly more structure and control, and international organized crime linkages, the post-Dudus era features a proliferation of gangs that are much more loosely organized, are spread out throughout the island, and for a variety

of reasons, are considerably more violent. At the same time the availability of guns has increased significantly with the ability to buy them with marijuana, which can be grown and harvested far more freely with decriminalization and the cessation of eradication efforts, and which has produced a situation where criminals are quite literally able to grow currency with which to purchase weapons.

What is further evident is that virulent gang violence has to be considered and treated apart from violent crime, so that


it is the underpinning culture of violence, and the social norms that engender ruthlessness and brutality, that must be considered as problems separate and apart from gang crime, even violent gang crime. Along these lines, the social and cultural factors that engender a propensity for young boys to join gangs, must be addressed.

What follows is a review of what has been done about the gang problem, as it has been delineated here, and with what outcomes.





# 3 Successes and Failure in Dealing with Gangs



Jamaica's murder rate fell from  
**62**  
 in 2009 to  
**36 per 100,000**  
 in 2014

Jamaica's attempts—successful and failed—to combat gang violence have been well-researched and analysed. Rather than reprise the events and outcomes of the transition from political to criminal gangs in the 1990s, or Operation Kingfish (2004-2012), here we focus on what appeared to have been a turning point, when Jamaica's murder rate fell from 62 in 2009 to 36 per 100,000 in 2014.<sup>139</sup> This was the post-Tivoli operation period, beginning in 2010, but gaining real momentum in 2011, when the Jamaican police stepped up their efforts to eradicate gangs and reduce gang violence.

Experts and stakeholders believe that the extremeness of the operation to apprehend Christopher "Dudus" Coke, and the visible multi-gang alliance that sought to repel the state forces, led to the broad realization that the gangs' power had come to threaten the state itself.<sup>140</sup> From then on, both the Jamaican government and, to an extent, the civilian population, began to distance themselves from the gangs, who thus became more vulnerable to the ensuing police crackdown.<sup>141</sup>

The crackdown on gangs, in the

**The failure of the king-pin strategy of going after criminal leaders, was not unique to Jamaica: similar strategies have precipitated chaos and record-setting murder rates in other countries that have tried it, such as Mexico.**

- Former Police chief

then-commissioner's words, involved "a proactive approach to policing in difficult circumstances with emphasis placed on a well-developed working plan and well-coordinated operational initiatives," "focused attention on gangs, depriving

criminals of the freedom to operate, and working steadfastly to a pre-determined policing plan," and "cross-border initiatives that assisted the process of containment, a strategy that he recommended be used as a template for operations and disrupting the activities of mobile criminals."<sup>142</sup>

The decline in murder was not sustained after 2014, and by 2017 Jamaica's homicide rate had risen steeply, in what, according to one hypothesis, was the symptom of a splintering underworld, and the repercussions of the security force crackdowns on the gangs. One argument is that the gangs used the crackdown to redefine their operations and avoid detection, and so splintered, dispersed, and diversified (see figure 2, which shows a steady increase in the number of gangs in the island). This fragmentation also resulted in expansion outside of the traditional gang hotbeds into rural areas. Table 3 shows that the number of gangs recorded in some rural parishes did increase between 2010 and 2018.

Beyond only a couple of instances, the state did not take advantage of the unique opportunity to re-acquire social control,

139 Mimi Yagoub, "Why Jamaica's homicide rate is up 20%," InSight Crime, June 20, 2017, [www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/why-jamaica-homicide-rate-up-20-percent/](http://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/why-jamaica-homicide-rate-up-20-percent/).

140 Yagoub; senior JCF Official.

141 Mimi Yagoub, 2017a.

142 "Police chief praises cops for crime reduction."

Experts and stakeholders believe that the extremeness of the operation to apprehend Christopher "Dudus" Coke, and the visible multi-gang alliance that sought to repel the state forces, led to the broad realization that the gangs' power had come to threaten the state itself.

## The decline in murder was not sustained after 2014, and by 2017 Jamaica's homicide rate had risen steeply...

legitimacy, and restore rule of law in communities that were previously controlled by gangs,<sup>143</sup> and to engage the communities with the appropriate prevention and intervention programmes, social services, and social controls.

The failure of this kingpin strategy of going after criminal leaders, was not unique to Jamaica: similar strategies have precipitated chaos and record-setting murder rates in other countries that have tried it, such as Mexico.<sup>146</sup> The JCF's view is that the gangs are able to quickly recruit and

replace members who are killed or incarcerated.<sup>147</sup>

There are also two events that occurred in 2014 that may correlate with the end of the decline. The first was the initiation of the commission of enquiry into the

Table 3. Number of gangs in Jamaica, by parish, between 2010 and 2018<sup>144,145</sup>

Parish	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
St James	9	11	17	20	19	19	27	33	28
Westmoreland	7	8	10	10	11	11	13	7	15
Hanover	*	*	3	4	5	5	7	8	8
St. Elizabeth	10	10	5	5	5	5	3	4	4
Clarendon	21	21	15	15	15	15	16	19	17
Manchester	3	3	5	5	5	5	4	7	6
St. Catherine	20	21	24	26	28	25	13	29	32
St. Andrew	63	65	73	76	87	87	82	122	131
Kingston	34	41	39	45	47	47	50	89	110
St. Thomas	10	11	11	12	12	12	12	14	7
Portland	*	*	8	10	9	9	8	8	8
St. Mary	5	5	3	3	3	4	4	5	6
St. Ann	5	7	2	3	5	5	6	6	5
Trelawny	4	6	6	7	7	7	4	4	4
Total	191	209	221	241	258	256	249	363	381

Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force. \*missing figures were not available.

142 "Police chief praises cops for crime reduction."

143 Harriott (2015a).

144 JCF collates the data based on police divisions. Kingston, St Andrew, and St. Catherine are broken down into multiple divisions, while all parishes are represented as a single division.

145 Requests were also made for breakdown of the number of gangs for the years 2008 and 2009. The research team was advised that these numbers were not available.

146 Mimi Yagoub, 2017a.

147 JCF, "Gang Violence in Jamaica."



Tivoli operation, in February 2014. The Commission began sitting in December 2014 and completed its last session in February 2016. The Commission's report was published in June 2016. One school of thought is that the political discourse around the commission of enquiry undermined the public support for the security forces and their work, which in turn led to a loss of confidence on the part of law enforcement officers to persist with the difficult tasks that the gang crack-down entailed. In this view the demise of the strategy was as much about politics, public perception, and police morale, as it was about policing tactics.<sup>148</sup>

Second was the resignation of the Commissioner of Police in the middle of the year. He had come into the position in 2009, had been a leader of the 2010 Tivoli operation, and was a key architect and implementer of the post-Tivoli crack-down. It was during his tenure that volatile divisions such as St. Andrew South halved their number of murders in 2011, to the lowest number in 19 years.<sup>149</sup> It later emerged that in one of the police divisions that had experienced a dramatic drop in murders—the Clarendon Division recorded 75 murders in 2011, a number that had not been seen since 1994—there was a “special” police death squad that was supplied by a senior JCF officer with resources to carry out extrajudicial killings, allegedly with the full backing of members of the Police High Command.<sup>150</sup>

148 Senior JCF officials.

149 Police chief praises cops for crime reduction,” *Observer*, January 7, 2012, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Police-chief-praises-cops-for-crime-reduction\\_10513148](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Police-chief-praises-cops-for-crime-reduction_10513148).

150 “Constable ‘Chucky’ Brown sentenced to life in prison for “death squad” involvement,” *RJR News*, January 25, 2019, <http://rjrnews.com/local/constable-chucky-brown-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-death-squad-involvement>

151 Harriott (2015a), 258; Harriott (2015b), 288.

The blowback of the crack-down strategy—which was not sustained, and which was plagued with questions of its integrity—was that it further exacerbated the splintering of gangs, and concomitantly, the increase in violent crime.

The anti-gang strategy employed by the state in the immediate post-Dudus crack-down did yield significant results in so far as murders went down, and in a couple of instances the state re-entered communities and re-established itself as the governing authority.<sup>151</sup> The blowback of that strategy—which was not sustained, and

which was itself plagued with questions of its integrity—was that it further exacerbated the splintering of gangs, and concomitantly, the increase in the incidence of acts of violence, and violent crime. Which is the situation we now, in 2020, have at hand.





## 4 Current Approach to Gang Violence



### 3 main aspects

of the GOJ's current approach to combatting gang violence are **suppression** **prevention/intervention** **legislation**



Since 2016, the GOJ has increasingly prioritized national security, as indicated by the significant increase in the security budget in 2016 compared to the seven years prior, and the marked increases in the budgetary allocations to the sector in 2018 and 2019.<sup>152</sup> The 2020/21 allocation for the Ministry of National Security was further increased by J\$1.7 billion, from J\$78 billion the previous year. That increase will

cover spending to boost the military's vehicle fleet, including to acquire armoured patrol carriers, to purchase and overhaul ships, as well as for cybersecurity initiatives, construction, and improvements.<sup>153</sup> The increase in resources is directly and indirectly meant to address the country's violence problem, particularly as it is manifested by gangs.

Containing criminal gangs requires a

three pronged approach: prevention, intervention, and suppression, which includes legislation. The GOJ's current approach to combatting gang violence incorporates all of these. Prevention involves the provision of and access to services that should be provided by the state to ensure that persons develop into responsible contributing members of society. Key in this first prong is access to quality education, health services, and

<sup>152</sup> Please see the Minister of National Security's 2019/2020 sectoral presentation, also attempts to suggest the murder rate went down as a result of states of emergency.

<sup>153</sup> McPherse Thompson and Steven Jackson, "More Cash For Crime - \$2b Jump for National Security But Capital Spending Falls," *Gleaner*, February 12, 2020, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20200212/more-cash-crime-2b-jump-national-security-capital-spending-falls>.

There was a significant increase in the security budget in 2016 compared to the seven years prior, and marked increases in the allocations to the sector in 2018 and 2019. The 2020/21 allocation for the Ministry of National Security was further increased by J\$1.7 billion, from J\$78 billion the previous year.



activities that engage young people positively.<sup>154</sup> Interventions are efforts to successfully disengage and extricate active members from their gangs by providing them with social alternatives and rehabilitation. Suppression speaks to the formal and informal social controls operationalized by the state and its actors in the judiciary.<sup>155</sup> Historically, suppressive and deterrent-heavy ideology and strategy has been the main approach by law enforcement all over the world,<sup>156</sup> including by the JCF. Suppression as an anti-violence or anti-gang strategy is, however, now widely viewed in the literature and by stakeholders as retrograde and counter-productive. Purely suppressive tactics by law enforcement have been deemed as ineffective,<sup>157</sup> and it is the emerging belief that “the repressive model of gang control” leads “to increased rates of violence.”<sup>158</sup>

In the current Jamaican context, however, the consensus among the relevant decision-makers is that the severity of the gang violence problem warrants concern with short-term results, to bring the problem under control, provide relief from violence for the affected population, and to check the power and corrosive influence of gangs and their leaders—a suppressive strategy. In the absence of a well-articulated, coherent, and practical alternative, promoted by a group or entity that has integrity and public support, short-term measures that involve suppression enhance the policy influence of the experts on the use of force, and the institutions that administer suppression—the security forces and their intelligence organizations.<sup>159</sup>

In the prime minister’s words: “What the SOE does is to provide a respite in

**The severity of the gang violence problem warrants concern with short-term results, to bring the problem under control, provide relief from violence, and to check the power and corrosive influence of gangs and their leaders—a suppressive strategy.**

the number of crimes, particularly murders. It helps to expand the number of law-enforcement personnel that we have on the ground, it helps to restrict the free movement of the criminal enterprise and then that gives [the security forces] an increased ability to do their work.”<sup>160</sup> In addition, as articulated by the Commissioner of Police: the respite from violence will augur well for citizens’ confidence in the security forces, and more people will come forward with evidence and information to capture criminals, recover guns, and build cases.

Thus the approach that the GOJ has taken towards gangs and gang violence since January 2018, with the States of Public Emergency (SOEs).<sup>161</sup> Under a state of emergency the security forces have the power to search, curtail operating hours of business, restrict access to places, and detain persons without a warrant. It also gives them the power to stop and question persons, and to seize property. The other objectives of this strategy are redolent of the post-2010 crackdown: intensifying investigations, taking suspected

gang members and leaders into custody, “strong security measures” to disrupt gangs’ operations, and “rooting out” the gangs.<sup>162</sup>

Other aspects of the GOJ’s suppressive strategy include employing technology to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis, led by the National Intelligence Bureau. The JCF’s National Strategic Anti-Gang Unit, supported by Proactive Investigative Units,<sup>163</sup> and guided by a National Strategic Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, are designated to “aggressively” investigate top tier gangs, in keeping with the provisions of the Anti-Gang Act. A number of other investigative innovations intended to weaken and bring down all gangs, regardless of their size and level of organization, are planned or underway.<sup>164</sup>

In 2017 the government also announced “The Law Reform (Zones of Special Operations) (Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act 2017,” commonly known as the ZOSO Act.<sup>165</sup> The ZOSO Act gives the prime minister

the power to designate any community a “zone” that requires the focused attention of security personnel and social services because of high rates of violence within the community. In September 2017 the first ZOSO was established in the community of Mount Salem in St. James.


ZOSO is premised on a “clear, hold, build” long term strategy,<sup>166</sup> and is meant to provide intervention from a twofold perspective. Clear and hold means that there is a “focused deterrence” by the state’s security force, whereby they enter the community, “clear” out any criminal elements and “hold” the line against these criminal groups, by maintaining a presence. The presence by the security forces then allows for social services, whether by the state or NGOs, to be deployed to rebuild the communities,<sup>167</sup> what one might

consider “social interventions,” broadly speaking. If this—reconnecting and establishing trust between the state and the community, so that these communities are in a position to resist efforts by gangs, who may otherwise prey upon them—is successful, this would bridge the gap that wasn’t properly addressed in the 2011-4 crackdown.

Up to the end of 2019 there were nine SOEs across the island, in seven police divisions. There is not yet sufficient evidence available (beyond numbers of murders) on the effects of the SOEs to make definitive conclusions, nor a long enough time to attempt a valid evaluation. There was a 22 percent fall in the number of murders in 2018 (compared to 2017,) a decline which the GOJ has attributed to the SOEs.<sup>168</sup> In St. James

in 2018 there were 100 murders, down from 335 in 2017, and the lowest number since 2006.<sup>169</sup> When the SOE was lifted in January 2019, St. James’ murder patterns returned to their pre-2018 situation. The state cites these changes in the murder rate as proof of success that the SOEs are working, but other preliminary data suggest that the SOEs rather than curtailing, may be causing a displacement of violence instead. For example, in the month after a SOE was declared in St. Andrew South (the police division that had the largest number of gangs of all police divisions in the island,) hotspot monitoring showed that there was a significant decrease in violence in the division, but a corollary increase in the immediate surrounding areas. (see figure 7)

Figure 5. Differences in violent crime in St Andrew South pre and post SOE, 2019



Source: Mona Geo-Informatics, 2019

154 Lafontaine, Tania, Myles Ferguson, and J. Stephen Wormith, *Street gangs: A review of the empirical literature on community and corrections-based prevention, intervention and suppression strategies*, Saskatoon, SK: Saskatchewan Corrections, Public Safety and Policing, 2005.

155 Lafontaine et al.

156 Reed and Decker (2002).

157 Reed and Decker (2002).

158 Brotherton and Gude (2018).

159 Harriott (2015a).

160 Alecia Smith, “PM announces SOE in Clarendon and St. Catherine,” *Jamaica Information Service*, September 5, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/pm-announces-soe-in-clarendon-and-st-catherine/>.

161 Section 26 of the Jamaican Constitution states that a “period of public emergency” is any period during which: a. Jamaica is engaged in a war, b. There is in force a proclamation by the governor general declaring that a state of public emergency exists, and/or c. There is in force a resolution of each House supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of that House declaring that democratic institutions in Jamaica are threatened by subversion.

162 Arthur Hall, “Police Commissioner insist SOEs reaping success.”

163 The unit within each police division that is responsible for intelligence gathering.

164 JCF (2017), 7-8. (Gang Reduction Strategy).

165 Law Reform (“Zones of Special Operations) (Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act,” 2017.

166 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

167 Government of Jamaica (2014).

168 Arthur Hall, “Police Commissioner Insist SOEs Reaping Success,” *Observer*, November 10, 2019, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/police-commissioner-insist-soes-reaping-success\\_179240](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/police-commissioner-insist-soes-reaping-success_179240).

169 Adrian Frater and Hopeton Bucknor, “St. James Hits 100 Murders Despite SOE And ZOSO,” *Gleaner*, December 28, 2018, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20181228/st-james-hits-100-murders-despite-soe-and-zoso>.

SOEs are not sustainable in the long term, because of the immense amount of resources they require and the curtailment of civil rights involved. There is also the danger that long term SOEs run the risk of the country becoming a police state. The GOJ has stated repeatedly that it does not intend to pursue SOEs as a long term strategy, and that the state is pursuing a number of other strategies at the same time. For example, the stated intention is that once the JCF removes gangsters from the communities, there will be a coordinated effort by the Community Safety and Security Branch to “develop, institutionalize, and maintain intervention and diversion projects to engage the youths in a positive way.”<sup>170</sup> A 2018-9 study on a violence-ridden St. James community that was under the 2018 SOE, however, found that when the young men who were swept up by the police were released afterwards back into the community, there was no contact or follow up of these young men by social agencies, despite the fact that many of them were high school dropouts and looking for employment, common

markers of potential gang members.<sup>171</sup>

#### Legislation

Legislation is a key component of any approach to addressing Jamaica's violent gang crime problem. Despite Jamaica's longstanding challenges with gangs it has not had specific legislation to effectively combat these criminal organizations until recently. This delayed response of the state's justice system to put forward effective legislation forestalls law enforcement's effective response. For example, lottery scamming emerged as a problem in the early 2000s, with Jamaican law enforcement becoming aware of the prevalence of the crime in 2006. Yet the Law Reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act, more popularly referred to as the “Lotto Scam Law,” was not enacted until almost seven years later, in 2013.<sup>172</sup>

The Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act 2014, popularly referred to as the “Anti-Gang Act,” is the first of its kind in Jamaica that spe-

cifically targets criminal groups. Prior to its passage, law enforcement relied on existing legislation such as the Offences Against the Persons Act, 2011, and the Firearms Act, 1967. Up to November 2018, 448 persons were charged under the legislation with only two persons being successfully prosecuted.<sup>173</sup>

A study of the effects of the Anti-Gang Act on the rates of murder and organised crime in western Jamaica (a particularly violence-plagued area of the island), was commissioned by the Ministry of National Security in 2016.<sup>174</sup> It found a number of weaknesses, loopholes, and operational challenges in the legislation. The inherent limitations to the legislation include: the Act does not allow for search and seizure, a critical omission, nor for the interception of communication. Further, courts/prosecutors and investigators/police differ considerably in their interpretation of aspects of the legislation, including what constitutes a criminal organization.

There are also contingent limitations, contextual factors that impede the legislation's efficacy. These include: the need for an easy and user-friendly framework for a plea bargaining arrangement; difficulty in securing interim protection/accommodation for witnesses before they are included in the witness protection programme; witnesses' fear for their immediate and extended families, who can be targeted in retaliation (the witness protection programme does not readily provide for extended families); the culture of silence, particularly in communities with high gang density; the pervasive gang culture in which gangs/dons are seen as doing positive things, which reduces the willingness of residents to support the investigative process; covert evidence-gathering capability within the JCF is low; and inadequate funding and equipment for proactive investigators to engage in meaningful semi-covert and covert work operations, from which evidence may be obtained.<sup>175</sup>

The study's recommendations called for legislative revisions, clarification, wider and deeper training (for the JCF and the judiciary,) the investment of substantial resources to improve the quality of policing and to build investigative capacities, and the need for dialogue and coherence across the judiciary and police. A parliamentary review of the legislation commenced in 2018, with the objective of addressing some of these, and other, issues.

Since then, the Director of Public Prosecutions has established and equipped its own anti-gang unit, that has worked closely with the JCF to build cases that

are better suited to be prosecuted under the Act. In late 2018 through to 2019 there were several high profile cases that were significant, in part, because entire gangs were being prosecuted, or groups from one gang, rather than individual gang members. Some of these cases were dismissed because of a lack of sufficient evidentiary support,<sup>176</sup> primarily related to witnesses not appearing out of fear, or the disappearance or death of a key witness.<sup>177</sup> The murder of witnesses is a serious, longstanding, and debilitating problem that plagues many court cases in Jamaica; the propensity of gangs to use violence to further their objectives exacerbates this risk.<sup>178</sup>

Two of the cases, Uchence Wilson Gang and Dexter Street Gang, concluded in late 2019 and early 2020, were considered to be “tests” of the new approach by the DPP and the JCF to building cases around the

legislation.<sup>179</sup> Given the precedent of witnesses disappearing/being murdered, the prosecution applied for and was granted permission for witnesses to testify via video link under the Evidence (Special Measures) Act, 2012,<sup>180</sup> in an attempt to address that critical problem. If these cases are successful, the state will have a clear idea of what is needed to make prosecutable cases that are substantial enough to get convictions in the court.<sup>181</sup>

Some of the weaknesses identified by the review have since been addressed.<sup>182</sup> The use of plea bargaining, while commonplace in many jurisdictions, and done informally in Jamaica for some time, was formally done for the first time in Jamaica in 2019. The case against Tesha Miller was successfully prosecuted based on the evidence of one key witness, a former Clansman gang member who flipped. Already incarcerated for another crime, the wit-

**In late 2018 through to 2019 there were several high profile cases that were significant, in part, because entire gangs were being prosecuted, or groups from one gang, rather than individual gang members.**

170 JCF (2017), 13.

171 Study's findings were reported in “VPA calls for targeted violence intervention programmes for Cambridge,” Loop News, February 22, 2019, [www.loopjamaica.com/content/vpa-calls-targeted-violence-intervention-programmes-cambridge](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/vpa-calls-targeted-violence-intervention-programmes-cambridge).

172 CAPRI (2019a)

173 “Submissions of the Jamaica Constabulary Force on the challenges in relation to implementation of the Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act 2014,” Jamaica Constabulary Force, November 12, 2018.

174 Moncrieffe (2017). The study also reviewed the effectiveness of the Lotto Scam Law.

175 Moncrieffe, 8.

176 “Police Reject Blame After Dexter Street Gang Case Collapses in Court,” *Observer*, October 23, 2019, [www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Police\\_reject\\_blame\\_after\\_Dexter\\_Street\\_Gang\\_case\\_collapses\\_in\\_court](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Police_reject_blame_after_Dexter_Street_Gang_case_collapses_in_court).

177 “Eight Alleged Clansman Gang Members Freed of Charges,” *RJR News*, April 11, 2019, [www.rjrnews.com/local/eight-alleged-clansman-gang-members-freed-of-charges](http://www.rjrnews.com/local/eight-alleged-clansman-gang-members-freed-of-charges).

178 The increase in the 2020/21 budgetary allocation to the Ministry of National Security was, in part, earmarked for the Witness Protection Programme, probably as a response to the challenges presented by missing or fearful witnesses.

179 Nadine Wilson-Harris, “Uchence Wilson Gang Trial a Landmark Case for Cops – Commish,” *Gleaner*, July 8, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20190708/editors-forum-uchence-wilson-gang-trial-landmark-case-cops-commish>.

180 Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Uchence Wilson and other, Supreme Court ruling, <https://supremecourt.gov.jm/sites/default/files/judgments/Director%20of%20Public%20Prosecution%20v%20Wilson%2C%20Uchence%20and%20others.pdf>.

181 Wilson-Harris, “Uchence Wilson Gang Trial.”

182 Whether this was in direct response to the review or not is questionable; the relevant attorneys at the DPP's office had never seen the review.





ness negotiated a plea bargain agreement, utilizing the existing legislation (section 19 and 20 of the Plea Negotiation Act 2006, amended 2017,) that reduced his sentence for that crime, in exchange for providing testimony against Miller.

Other available legislative means to weaken gangs are financial. Jamaica enacted its Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) in 2007; at the time the objective was to compensate for shortfalls in the Money Laundering Act, 1996.<sup>183</sup> The JCF and Financial Investigations Division (FID)

of the Ministry of Finance and Planning have brought several cases against persons with unexplained wealth before the court, with some successes. (See table 4, which shows the sums of money that have been seized and forfeited between 2014 and 2016 by Jamaican officials.)

Table 4. Seizures and Forfeitures of Ill-Gotten Money, 2014-2016

	Total Seized		Total Forfeited	
	JA	US	JA	US
2014	\$26,657,394	\$860,256	\$2,666,086	\$1,181,902
2015	\$15,929,950	\$114,688	\$2,352,686	\$571,549
2016	\$7,042,707	\$102,000	\$7,987,107.93	\$431,000.33

Source: Moncrieffe, 2017

183 POCA has since been amended.

Most of these cases involve business persons who have engaged in some type of fraud.<sup>184</sup> The legislation is not geared towards criminal prosecution; it is only used to sequester illicitly acquired wealth. However, the use of financial investigations techniques as provided for under POCA serve to uncover the movement of monies that are generated by crime, and that serve to finance criminal enterprises. Persons who deal with these funds knowing that they are proceeds of crime are guilty of money-laundering.

There is potential to conduct more financial investigations alongside criminal investigations of gangs, though pursuing financial crime investigations against violent criminal gangs is hampered by the fact that the vast majority of gang members are unbanked or not deeply embed-

ded in financial institutions. As such they are not subject to suspicious transaction reports that banks and other financial institutions are obliged to file, and often do not own substantial assets available for forfeiture. However, as criminal enterprises become larger and their activities extend to corrupt payments, which then bring other players such as professional advisors (to legitimize these funds) into the scheme, these funds should naturally seek to enter the financial system. The records available through financial investigations then can create a strong evidential basis for prosecution, when considered together with evidence of the primary criminal activity. The constraint is that existing law enforcement players do not necessarily have the awareness to initiate financial investigations as a corollary to primary criminal investigations, nor does

FID have the capacity to work alongside each and every investigation.<sup>185</sup>

There are other tools available under the POCA legislation that are not as widely used as they could be, in going after criminal gangs. These include specialized investigatory tools, post-conviction pecuniary penalty orders, and civil recovery lawsuits. These could be used to attack criminal activity and discourage otherwise innocent parties (such as professional advisors) from participating in these criminal schemes, or providing services to criminals.<sup>186</sup>

Around the world, particularly in the Commonwealth, governments and law enforcement agencies have turned to Unexplained Wealth Orders to part criminals from their illicitly acquired wealth,

184 "FID Takes \$34.6 million Bite Out of Crime Through Pecuniary Penalty Orders," Financial Investigative Division, Ministry of Finance and the Public Service, November 1, 2019, [www.fid.gov.jm/fid-takes-34-6-million-bite-out-of-crime-through-pecuniary-penalty-orders/](http://www.fid.gov.jm/fid-takes-34-6-million-bite-out-of-crime-through-pecuniary-penalty-orders/); "Gov't Seeking Forfeiture of Over \$203M from Businesswoman," *Gleaner*, July 02, 2018, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20180702/govt-seeking-forfeiture-over-203m-businesswoman>.  
 185 FID official.  
 186 FID official.




and, in some jurisdictions, prosecute them for the crimes they carried out to amass it. In Ireland, for example, the Proceeds of Crime Act (1996), with the support of a specialized unit, has been successfully used to pursue criminals who have accumulated large amounts of property with no apparent legitimate sources of income.<sup>187</sup> A proposal to amend POCA in Jamaica to allow for a similar approach using Unexplained Wealth Orders was returned by the attorney general to further explore and resolve apparent constitutional infringements.

Yet another option is an asset recovery incentivisation scheme (ARIS), which would allow those agencies that work to combat money laundering and other financial crimes to be able to utilise a portion of the funds recovered in order to improve their capacity and operational effectiveness. Those proceeds of crime could even be ploughed back into vulnerable communities, which would be a powerful symbol and deterrent, as well as provide much needed material resources to those citizens. The Ministry of National Security announced in September 2019 that it intends to pursue this legislation.<sup>188</sup>

#### Prevention and Intervention

Suppressive strategies typically address problems that already exist; they do little to prevent new recruits from joining gangs or organized crime groups, and they do not address the social conditions that correlate with the propensity for youth to join gangs, and the expansion of these gangs.<sup>189</sup> In a context such as Jamaica's where the JCF itself considers there to be an endless supply of violence producers ready to join gangs and do their bidding, social interventions are essential.<sup>190</sup> The Ministry of National Security's website lists 80 (formal) interventions in four of the island's most crime-affected par-



ishes so as “to give a clear picture of the extent and placement, by community, of programme intervention.”<sup>191</sup> These interventions are implemented by non-governmental, governmental, and foreign donor organizations. This is to say, there is no shortage of interventions that directly or indirectly aim to address the social, cultural, economic, and psycho-social factors that correlate with joining gangs, community's vulnerability to gangs, and the violence associated with gangs. Of these, we highlight a few that the state is pursuing.

The largest social intervention programme in Jamaica is the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), an initiative that began in 2002, and over-

seen by the Ministry of National Security, and funded by donor partners.<sup>192</sup> The programme targets volatile communities with the stated aims to prevent and reduce crime and violence, strengthen crime management capabilities, and improve the delivery of judicial services.<sup>193</sup> The programme works in many fields with other actors and stakeholders, such as community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other state entities. Its work directly addresses some of the basic elements of preventing youth from joining gangs, which is to strengthen communities, families, and schools; improve community supervision; train teachers and parents to manage disruptive youth; and teach students interpersonal skills.<sup>194</sup>

187 Booz Allen Hamilton, “Comparative evaluation of unexplained wealth orders,” U.S. Department of Justice, 2011, [www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237163.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237163.pdf), 132.

188 “Gov't Moving To Sign Agreement On Sharing Recovered Assets,” *Gleaner*, September 24, 2019, <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/news/20190924/govt-moving-sign-agreement-sharing-recovered-assets>.

189 UNDP (2012), 87.

190 “Social interventions” in the broadest sense possible—any non-law enforcement attempt at changing the conditions which are thought to cause or correlate with the proliferation of gangs and violence.

191 “Crime Prevention and Community Safety Programme Mapping,” Ministry of National Security, undated, [www.mns.gov.jm/content/crime-prevention-and-community-safety-programme-mapping](http://www.mns.gov.jm/content/crime-prevention-and-community-safety-programme-mapping).

192 The UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) (Canada). The donor-funded iteration of CSJP is scheduled to end in December 2020, with the expectation that there will be a transition to GOJ-funded set of interventions, some which will be carried over from the CSJP.

193 MNS - Citizen Security and Justice Programme I (2008).

194 James Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs,” *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, [www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf).



The JCF has stated that prevention and diversion, by way of interventions, is a key aspect of their gang reduction strategy.<sup>195</sup> Among the JCF's intervention initiatives are school sensitizations “which seek to enhance prevention and diversion efforts, and inform the youths... of the signs and likely consequences of gang involvement”; the Proactive Violence Interruption Strategy (PVIS), the Safe Schools Programme through the School Resource Officers, and the greater use of Neighbourhood Watch, Farmers' Watch, and Business Watch, which the JCF considers important vehicles through which gang

violence can be disrupted, prevented, and diverted.”<sup>196</sup>

There are other intervention and prevention-type initiatives carried out by the GOJ, whether through the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of National Security, or other GOJ ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that could be considered anti-gang interventions, in that they target unattached young people, mainly males, who are particularly vulnerable to joining gangs. Among these are the Housing, Opportunity, Production and Employment (HOPE) Programme, a

training and apprenticeship programme, through the National Service Corps. An associated programme is Learning, Earning, Giving, Saving (LEGS), to provide these youth the opportunity to “work to learn, work to earn, work to give service to the nation and work to save for their future.”<sup>197</sup> The development of uniformed groups in high schools is also a priority for the administration, mainly via the Jamaica Combined Cadet Corps; in 2019 it was announced that the GOJ plans to establish cadet corps in all high schools across the country by the end of F/Y 2021.<sup>198</sup>

195 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

196 JCF (2017), 12.

197 “Housing, Opportunity, Production, and Employment (HOPE) Programme,” Social Development Commission n.d., <https://sdc.gov.jm/housing-opportunity-production-and-employment-hope-programme/>.

198 Okoye Henry, “Cadet Corps to be Established in all High School,” *Jamaica Information Service*, November 4, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/cadet-corps-to-be-established-in-all-high-schools/>

### The Risks Associated With Anti-Gang Interventions

The question of “what works?” to remedy the social conditions that correlate with gangs is hotly debated, and rightly so. It has long been acknowledged that the evidence that any impact that the many social interventions have had over the years is mostly anecdotal and speculative. Many have not been sustained, and, as obtains in many countries throughout the world, evidence-based programming in areas such as violence interventions is not standard procedure.<sup>199</sup> There are many NGOs in Jamaica that are capable of designing and implementing meaningful programmes, a large number of skilled and concerned citizens who can facilitate these programmes, and huge amounts of resources that have been invested.<sup>200</sup> But these efforts have not translated into a national impact, and in the context of a suppressive mindset on the part of the leading policy makers, doubt has been overtly and implicitly cast on such interventions’ value and efficacy.

That skepticism is not unwarranted. The UNDP’s Caribbean Development Report 2012’s in-depth treatment of street gangs, organized crime, and violence, highlights the risks of uninformed responses to gangs. With regard to the impact of prevention and social intervention approaches to gang membership and crime they state: “while a few studies report some positive impacts, most of the research examining these strategies finds that they are ineffective in reducing gang membership or gang crime. Indeed some of the research indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang membership and gang delinquency.”<sup>201</sup>

Jamaica is not unique in the lack of evidence from middle- and, in particular,



low-income countries on preventing armed and other violence, despite the fact they suffer disproportionate levels of both.<sup>202</sup> Many behavioural interventions are widely implemented without being adequately tested because it seems intuitive that they should work; unfortunately, often when these interventions are tested with randomized control trials, many have been found to be ineffective or even cause harm.<sup>203</sup> Nevertheless, even with these justifiable concerns about social interventions as they are presently carried out, it is only through initiatives that are crafted for specific social problems and

troubled places, to be implemented in specific contexts where there are known opportunities and constraints, that any feasible means of gang prevention and control can occur.<sup>204</sup>

Even where “what works” is known, there are endemic capacity deficits that fetter the translation of robust evidence-based interventions into scaled up, institutionalized programmes. For example, Reach Up is an early stimulation intervention that targets undernourished, poor children; integrating parenting skills and early psychosocial stimulation results

“While a few studies report some positive impacts, most of the research examining these strategies find that they are ineffective in reducing gang membership or gang crime. Indeed some of the research indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang membership and gang delinquency.”

- UNDP (2012)

in significantly improved developmental outcomes—including with regard to criminal activity and violent behaviour.<sup>205</sup> The programme was designed and tested in Jamaica, the results were published by a Nobel Prize winning economist in the journal *Nature*, and other countries adopted the intervention on a large scale, but it took over 15 years for Jamaica’s own Ministry of Health to adopt and pilot the intervention across the island.

There is a need for evidence-informed,

context-specific proposals that do not uncritically transfer anti-gang or anti-violence programmes from elsewhere, that can be applied to short-term approaches, and that are linked to long-term programming. The formulation and systematization of comprehensive and integrated approaches to the gang and organized crime problems require a deep understanding of the cultural, social, criminogenic processes that contextualize extreme violence production. It is apparently in this context that the announce-

ment of a Violence Prevention Commission was made by the prime minister in 2018; in July 2019 it was announced that the Commission was to begin work. The objective of the commission is to examine all aspects of violence and ways to address it, by gathering all the research and studies already done on violence, and make recommendations.<sup>206</sup> This most recent initiative deserves full support and adequate resources, to inform the necessary social interventions.

205 Christine Powell, Helen Baker-Henningham, Susan Walker, Jacqueline Gernay and Sally Grantham-McGregor, Feasibility of integrating early stimulation into primary care for undernourished Jamaican children: cluster randomised controlled trial, *British Medical Journal*, June 24, 2004, 38132.503472.7C.

206 Latonya Linton, “Violence Prevention Commission Begins Work,” Jamaica Information Service, July 18, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/violence-prevention-commission-begins-work/>.

199 CAPRI (2019b); Instinto de Vida, “Latin America can reduce homicide by 50 percent in 10 years,” Igarape Institute, Brazil, July 2017, <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/11-08-2017-Campanha-Instinto-de-Vida-EN.pdf>. CAPRI (2019).

200 Leslie (2010).

201 UNDP (2012), 83.

202 Mark Bellis, Lisa Jones, Karen Hughes, and Sara Hughes, “Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence: What Works?” (Background Paper Oslo Conference on Armed Violence, Liverpool John Moores University, Centre for Public Health, the World Health Organization Department of Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability, and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, April 2010, [www.poa-iss.org/KIT/2010\\_What-works.pdf](http://www.poa-iss.org/KIT/2010_What-works.pdf); Instinto de Vida (2017), 8; McLean and Blake Lobba (2009), 74.

203 Wilson and Juarez (2015).

204 Though there is not a huge body of knowledge, gang experts have articulated the need for an abundance of caution in uncritically transferring anti-gang programmes from elsewhere to the region. Harriott (2015).

It is only through initiatives that are crafted for specific social problems and troubled places, to be implemented in specific contexts where there are known opportunities and constraints, that any feasible means of prevention and control can occur.



## 5 Analysis, Conclusion, Recommendations



The role of civil society is essential. **“Putting pressure”** on the government is not enough. **A coordinated effort that involves not only key civil societystakeholders, but the population at large, duly made aware of the issues, including the finer details, should hold the government accountable.**

The success of the 2011-4 policing strategy that brought down Jamaica's murder rate to a level it had not experienced in decades was undermined by evidence that the crackdown may have had a significant dark side with regard to extrajudicial actions, and other abuses, and the failure of the state to maximize the opportunity presented by the vacuum. It also appears to have had the unintended consequence of splintering the gangs, causing them to increase in number, and given their loose structure, those new gangs were more unstable, and more virulent in their violence production, leading to a rise in the murder rate after 2015.

A similar crackdown approach has been taken since 2017-8, with suppressive strategies that aim to eliminate the gangs, this time with the heaviest policing measure that exists, the state of emergency. At the same time, there are more resources for the security apparatus, and intensive efforts to use the anti-gang legislation to investigate and prosecute criminal gangsters. There is a concerted effort to upgrade the image of the JCF—a rebranding, as it were—with a view to building stronger public support for the police and their work. A wide range of anti-violence interventions are implemented by the state and non-state actors.

The metric of the number of murders,

however, is inadequate to gauge the success or failure of the current suppressive approach. It is an important indicator, but when there is other preliminary data suggesting that violence and crime have simply been displaced and dispersed, not eradicated, it is unlikely that any initial declines in murder will be sustained. The most obvious indicator of the legislative approach would be number of convictions; judgements in the two big cases are yet to be handed down. The outcomes of social interventions are difficult to ascertain, in part because many of them take years to show results (if there are any results to be had,) and because many, if not most interventions, as they are currently designed and implemented in Jamaica, are not evidence-based and are not systematically monitored and evaluated.

Ultimately, a sustained decrease in violence in general, and murder in particular, without continued use of states of emergency, would be considered a successful outcome of an anti-gang strategy. Thus gauging the success or lack thereof the current anti-gang strategy requires more time, and more evidence, than currently obtains.

Even as we await “results,” there are areas that can and should be given attention to strengthen the current approach. The JCF's definition of gangs, does not, on the face of it, serve it well, because it

does not appear to recognize the very disparate groupings that require very different responses whether in terms of prevention or suppression. For example, high school gangs may mimic established gangs, and are engaged in delinquency and school-level extortion, but any law enforcement response to those groups of (usually) boys, would necessarily differ from the response to the street-level gang or even corner crew. Furthermore, by putting all these disparate groupings into one lump, “gang,” and putting that large number into the public domain, for example when the Minister says in parliament that there are 381 gangs in Jamaica, suggests a situation that exaggerates and misleads with regard to the scale and nature of the problem. Further work on definitions of gangs and criminal groups is needed not only to help develop a common understanding, but also to better comprehend the structural, functional, and behavioural characteristics that differentiate them. Differentiating between them is critical in order to accurately and effectively diagnose and respond to problems associated with each type.<sup>207</sup>

The potential for “following the money” could be exploited more than obtains at present. Financial investigations should be routinely conducted alongside criminal investigations of gangs. This requires proactively increasing awareness among law enforcement and justice system players

The outcomes of social interventions are difficult to ascertain, in part because many of them take years to show results (if there are any results to be had,) and because many, if not most interventions, as they are currently designed and implemented in Jamaica, are not evidence-based and are not systematically monitored and evaluated.



of the possibilities which exist under the POCA, and increasing the capacity of the relevant agencies such as the FID to conduct these investigations. Unexplained wealth orders and the financial investigation aspect of criminal investigations in general, and particularly against gangs, could be transformative. The discussion on Unexplained Wealth Orders should be reopened, with greater public awareness of the role such legislative change could play in the country's crime and violence problem. Similarly, an asset recovery incentivisation scheme could have powerful deterrent and symbolic effects, as would modifying beneficial ownership laws so that they are more transparent.

Also with regard to legislation is the current, some would say outdated, status of the Jamaican judiciary's evidence threshold. Modifying the threshold to make computer-generated evidence easier to be admitted is one simple fix. Making it a more standard procedure (rather than an exception) for witnesses to testify via video link, would go a far way in having the witnesses needed for stronger cases that can be prosecuted. While this is an area that requires a far more thorough and legally-informed treatment than this report allows, to make very specific recommendations, it is an area that virtually every stakeholder who was interviewed for this report brought up as a barrier to more, and more effective, prosecutions and convictions of violent criminals.

207 Katz and Maguire (2015).

208 Harriott (2015), 342-343.

209 Harriott (2015), 343.

210 Harriott (2015), 343.

**While a few studies report some positive impacts, most of the research examining these strategies find that they are ineffective in reducing gang membership or gang crime. Indeed some of the research indicates that these programmes lead to an increase in gang membership and gang delinquency.**

**- UNDP (2012)**

Social interventions should be evidence-based, context-appropriate, and properly evaluated. Though this may appear straightforward, the problem of uninformed interventions garnering huge amounts of resources when the results or unknown or might even do harm, is not fully appreciated to the extent that the requisite changes have not occurred.

In all of this, the role of civil society is essential. "Putting pressure" on the government is not enough. A coordinated effort that involves not only key civil society stakeholders, but the population at large, duly made aware of the issues, including the finer details, should hold the government accountable. For example, civil society needs to demand more from the government with regard to social interventions. Stakeholders should be empowered with the knowledge to de-

mand that the state justify interventions, explain why the communities where they are being implemented have been chosen, prove that they are evidence-based, and entail systematic, rigorous monitoring and evaluation. This information should be made public and easily accessible. By making transparent the process by which a community is selected, for example, questions of partisan favouritism are eliminated, which then makes it more likely to sustain the intervention across political administrations. As another example, there should be greater scrutiny of the prioritization of a particular age group for targeted anti-violence interventions, bearing in mind that such scrutiny can only be meaningful if people understand the issues, and have the information to properly question and evaluate.

## Conclusion

Since 2011, Jamaica's gang situation—the context, structure, and dynamics—has changed. Jamaican gangs have and are splintered: there are many more of them, and they are more loosely-organized. They are well-armed, and able to virtually grow currency to purchase new, high-powered weapons. They are extremely violent, often carrying out murders where there is no material motive. The historical relationship between partisan politics and gangs continues to transition from direct links between patronage, gang violence and the electoral cycle, to less distinctive relationships that are speculated about, and seldom substantiated. Police corruption is a problem, largely, it is thought, in the form of police taking payment for tipping off gangsters, or directly participating in gang criminal activity. This corruption is also not well evidenced. Many gangs do engage in organized crime as regards localized extortion rackets, contract killings, robbery, and scamming. They are also engaged in cross border criminal activities, such as illegal drug trafficking where the drugs are primarily traded for arms. The links between transnational organized crime networks and Jamaica's violent gangs, however, are far more fluid and transient than once obtained, and to the extent that high level transnational organized crime is happening in Jamaica, it suits those actors better to avoid association with the violent gangs than to be involved with them.

The state has invested significantly more money into the security apparatus, a large portion of which is directly or indirectly

meant to address the gang problem, via a mostly suppressive strategy that is heavy on policing. Attempts to attack the gang problem via legislation have been amplified and the Anti-Gang Act is being tested. Social interventions, which are essential to change the drivers and correlating factors that provide for the gangs' ongoing existence and proliferation, are not producing significant, measurable results, in large part because they are not evidence based, sustained, or properly evaluated. That the interventions are not meeting expectations does not mean they should not be pursued; rather they should be approached with sufficient resources and will so they can yield positive changes.

Existing research on state responsiveness to initiate and/or advance gang control programmes tells us that truly meaningful efforts to combat gangs and gang violence depend on the power configurations in the political administrations and states as well as within the political parties. For example, new and meaningful gang and organized crime control and prevention measures tend to be taken in the early stages of a new administration.<sup>208</sup> Further, events that reveal the character of the problem and shock the political and social systems may mobilize the populations for effective gang and crime control.<sup>209</sup> This is what may have happened post-Tivoli, though it was not sustained. It should be sufficient for the existing high levels of violence and violent crime to shock the Jamaican people out of their complacency, and to mobilize support, whether for the security forces'

current efforts, or to rally around some other demand for action.

This points to the importance of civic pressures for good governance, and the power shifts and structural changes that they help to bring about that contribute to improved state responsiveness.<sup>210</sup> The most obvious iteration of this in the Jamaican context is for civil society to exert pressure on the GOJ and the opposition to arrive at a non-partisan agreement on specific anti-gang and anti-gang violence actions. This is the basis for the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica's (PSOJ) successful push for a bipartisan national stakeholder crime summit in October 2019, an initiative which has been followed up with stakeholder consultations, the assignment of a committee of experts, and the drafting of a plan of action. But there is room for greater engagement and advocacy on specific issues, such as increasing law enforcement's financial investigation capacity, and ongoing police reform.

The goal of this report was to synthesize the existing research and knowledge on gang violence in Jamaica, particularly as it currently exists, with a view to making policy recommendations that may bridge any identified gaps. However, this report is as much aimed at civil society and the general public as it is at policy and law makers, given the critical role that civil society can and should play in the effort to reduce gang violence in Jamaica, and thus the following recommendations are not only towards policy change, but towards civil society to advocate for these.

# Recommendations




## 1.

Social interventions, done properly, are essential. The government should provide more transparency around what social interventions are being invested in, how and why those interventions have been selected, and how they are to be measured. The state needs to be held more accountable as regards social interventions, particularly by civil society.



## 2.

Increase the scope and depth of financial investigations into criminal activity at all levels, not only financial crimes. Pursue legislative change with regard to unexplained wealth orders to put the burden of proof on the owner of the suspected asset, and to asset recovery incentive schemes, having addressed any extant constitutional constraints. Empower, expand, and support the Financial Investigation Division (FID) to make it more effective and able to conduct investigations. Proactively engage the judiciary and the police to ensure they are aware of how and why financial investigations are critical, and how they can be used in the fight against gangs. Going after the proceeds of gang organized crime is a powerful disincentive and, symbol. (It doesn't hurt that it raises revenue.)



## 3.

Modernize the evidentiary threshold for criminal and other prosecution, in particular to modify the restrictions around using electronically-generated evidence (such as videos), and witnesses testifying via video link.



## 4.

Make further and ongoing use of the plea bargain option with incarcerated or otherwise convicted potential witnesses.



## 5.

Maintain and emphasize the distinction between crime and violence. The recently-established Violence Prevention Commission, given its mandate and membership, has the potential to put forward important evidence-based recommendations to deal specifically with the violence aspect of Jamaica's gang problem. In doing its work the Commission should keep stakeholders and the public engaged in its findings, and proposals.



## 6.

Proceed with and engage the public on a bipartisan anti-crime consensus. This will pave the way for bipartisan agreement on policies and programmes that will not be affected by changes in political administration, and will better ensure the continuity needed for policies to have an effect. The public's engagement with the process and the resulting consensus is important for accountability and buy-in, and should be actively sought and supported.





## References

Black, Lorna. 2004. "Jamaica." In *Teen Gangs: A Global View*, edited by Maureen Duffy and Scott Gillig, 121-136. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Boerzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse. 2010. "Governance without a State. Can it Work?" *Regulation and Governance* 4, no. 2: 113-134. [www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/international/atasp/publikationen/4\\_artikel\\_papiere/2010\\_TR\\_Governance\\_without\\_a\\_State/index.html](http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/international/atasp/publikationen/4_artikel_papiere/2010_TR_Governance_without_a_State/index.html).

Brotherton, David and Rafael Gude. 2018. "The Perspectives of Street Gangs and Their Possible Effects on Declining Homicide Rates In Ecuador." Inter-American Development Bank. <https://webimages.iadb.org/publications/2019-01/Social-Inclusion-from-Below-The-Perspectives-of-Street-Gangs-and-Their-Possible-Effects-on-Declining-Homicide-Rates-in-Ecuador.pdf>.

Burt, Geoff, Mark Sedra, Bernard Headley, Camille Hernandez-Ramdwar, Randy Seepersad and Scot Wortley. 2016. *Deportation, Circular Migration and Organized Crime Jamaica Case Study*. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada. [https://secgovgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SGG\\_Jamaica\\_Case\\_Study\\_2016.pdf](https://secgovgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SGG_Jamaica_Case_Study_2016.pdf).

CAPRI. 2007. A Landscape Assessment of Political Corruption in Jamaica. UWI, Mona: Caribbean Policy Research Institute. [www.capricaribbean.org/documents/landscape-assessment-political-corruption-jamaica](http://www.capricaribbean.org/documents/landscape-assessment-political-corruption-jamaica).

———. 2018. From Force to Service: Transforming the Jamaican Police. UWI, Mona: Caribbean Policy Research Institute. <https://capricaribbean.org/documents/force-service-transforming-jamaican-police>.

———. 2019a. Zero Murders: Searching for Lessons from Two Decades of Anti-Violence Interventions in August Town. UWI, Mona: Caribbean Policy Research Institute. <https://capricaribbean.org/documents/zero-murders-searching-lessons-two-decades-anti-violence-interventions-august-town>

———. 2019b. Scamming, Gangs, and Violence in Montego Bay. UWI, Mona: Caribbean Policy Research Institute. <https://capricaribbean.org/documents/scamming-gangs-and-violence-montego-bay>

Government of Jamaica. 2014. *A New Approach: National Security Policy for Jamaica. Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation*. Kingston, Jamaica: Ministry of National Security. <https://cabinet.gov.jm/resources/national-security-policy-2014/>.

Harriott, Anthony. 2000. *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica. Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies*. Kingston: The University of the West Indies Press.

———. 2009. "Controlling Violent Crime: Models and Policy Options," The Grace Kennedy Foundation Lecture 2009. [www.gracekennedy.com/images/lecture/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf](http://www.gracekennedy.com/images/lecture/GRACE-Lecture-2009.pdf).

———. 2015. "Moving Forward: Responding to Gangs and Organized Crime in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by Anthony Harriott and Charles M. Katz, 337- 347. Mona: UWI Press.

———. 2015a. "Violence Reduction as Gang Reduction and Control: Suppression and the Case of the Shower-Presidential Click." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by Anthony Harriott and Charles M. Katz, 213-268. Mona: UWI Press.

———. 2015b. "Gang Prevention and Control in Jamaica: Social prevention and the Case of the Spanglers." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by Anthony Harriott and Charles M. Katz, 269-306. Mona: UWI Press.

Jaffe, Rivke. 2012. "Criminal Dons and Extralegal Security Privatisation in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica." *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 33. No 2, 184-197. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9493.2012.00457.x>.

Jaffe, Rivke. 2013. "The hybrid state: Crime and citizenship in urban Jamaica." *American Ethnologist* 40, no. 4 (2013): 734-748. <https://anthrosource-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ez.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/doi/full/10.1111/amet.12051>

Jaitman, Laura (ed.). 2017. *The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Katz, Charles. 2015. "An Introduction to the Gang Problem in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by Anthony Harriott and Charles M. Katz, 1 - 27, Mona: UWI Press

Katz, Charles and Edward R. Maguire. 2015. "Diagnosing Gang Violence in the Caribbean." In *Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of State and Society*, edited by Anthony Harriott and Charles M. Katz, 175 - 212, Mona: UWI Press

Levy, Horace. 2001. *"They cry'respect!": urban violence and poverty in Jamaica*". Centre for Population, Community and Social Change, Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of the West Indies, Mona.

Levy, Horace. 2009. *Killing Streets & Community Revival*. Arawak Publications.

Levy, Horace. 2012. *Youth Violence and Organized Crime in Jamaica: Causes and Counter-Measures. An Examination of the Linkages and Disconnections*. Final Technical Report. Kingston: The University of the West Indies (UWI)-Institute of Criminal Justice and Security (ICJS).

Lewis, Marjorie, Dianne McIntosh and Anna Kasafi Perkins. 2019. "Some Girls Are So Vicious that Even the Boys Fear Them': Girls and Gangs in Jamaica." In *Female Child Soldiering, Gender Violence, and Feminist Theologies*, edited by S. Willhauck. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21982-6\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21982-6_7).

Manwaring, Max G. 2012. *Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars* (International and Security Affairs Series). University of Oklahoma Press.

McLean, Andrew and Sherrone Blake Lobba. 2009. *Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica*. United Nations Development Programme. [undp.org/content/dam/jamaica/docs/researchpublications/governance/CommunitySecurityAssessmentReport.pdf](http://undp.org/content/dam/jamaica/docs/researchpublications/governance/CommunitySecurityAssessmentReport.pdf).

Mogensen, Michael. 2005. "Corner and Area Gangs in Inner-city Jamaica: Children in Organized Armed Violence." [http://www.helpjamaica.org/downloads/reports/COAV\\_report.pdf](http://www.helpjamaica.org/downloads/reports/COAV_report.pdf).

Moncrieffe, Joy. 2017. "Study of the effects of the law reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act 2013 (Lotto Scam Law) and the Criminal Justice (Suppression of Organizations) Act 2014 on the rates of Murder and Organised Crime in Western Jamaica." Kingston, Jamaica: Ministry of National Security.

Reed, Winifred and Scott H. Decker (Eds). 2002. "Responding to gangs." Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, Department of Justice. [www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/190351.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/190351.pdf).

UNODC. 2019. *Global Study on Homicide 2019*. Vienna. <https://unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html>

UNODC and World Bank. 2007. *Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean*. Report No. 37820. A Joint Report. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. [www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr\\_and\\_Vio\\_Car\\_E.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.pdf)

UNDP. 2012. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012*. [www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/C\\_bean\\_HDR\\_Jan25\\_2012\\_3MB.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/Latin%20America%20and%20Caribbean%20HDR/C_bean_HDR_Jan25_2012_3MB.pdf).


Watson-Williams, Carol. 2018. "Women's Health Survey 2016 Jamaica," co-publication of the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2018). <https://publications.iadb.org/en/womens-health-survey-2016-jamaica-final-report>

Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminister Press.

Wilson, Timothy. 2015. *Redirect: Changing the Stories We Live By*. New York: Back Bay Books.

Wilson, Timothy and Lindsay Juarez. 2015. "Intuition is Not Evidence: Prescriptions for Behavioral Interventions from Social Psychology." *Behavioral Science & Policy* 1 (1), Spring. [https://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/bsp\\_voll1is1\\_wilson\\_384f033534b21e](https://issuu.com/behavioralsciencepolicyassociation/docs/bsp_voll1is1_wilson_384f033534b21e).

Wood, Jane L. 2014. "Understanding Gang Membership: The Significance of Group Processes." Centre of Research and Education in Forensic Psychology, University of Kent.



# Appendix I

## Methodology

This study utilizes a mixed methods approach to understanding the gang situation in Jamaica, and the efforts being used to address them. The term “mixed methods” refers to the integration, or “mixing,” of quantitative and qualitative data within a single investigation. The basic premise of this methodology is that such integration permits a more complete and synergistic utilization of data than do separate quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis.<sup>212</sup>

The research was mostly qualitative. A desk review was conducted to assess previous research on gangs, violence, and organized crime in Jamaica, including literature from official sources. Jamaica's gang

problem is (rightly) considered urgent, and a priority for the state, and receives a great deal of attention from the media, and from a wide variety of stakeholders whose mandate, in one way or another, is furthering Jamaica's development. The prominence of the issue, and the urgency that surrounds it, means that news reports, policy decisions, and policy-related discussions and announcements about gangs and the country's violence problem are produced daily, amounting to a dynamic and fast-moving policy environment. The in-depth expert and key stakeholder interviews that were conducted, therefore, were particularly valuable as much of the information gathered from those interviews was not readily available

in the public sphere. Similarly, news articles on the topic were also heavily relied on for information that was not otherwise accessible. Statistics and documentation from the Jamaica Constabulary Force, and from Mona Geoinformatics Institute, were used in the analysis. The analytic strategy used for this study is a problem-driven content analysis of the interviews, the available data, and existing literature related to gangs, crime, and violence.<sup>213</sup>

## Limitations and Challenges

Secondary data on crime in Jamaica is difficult to collect. The problem of unreliable or inaccessible data is an established weakness in Caribbean crime and security research especially as it relates to gangs and organized crime.<sup>214</sup> The JCF primary data, which while more available than other data sources, is limited, largely due to the shortcomings of the methodology

used by the JCF to classify homicides,<sup>215</sup> and the focus on numbers of murders, and not other variables that are related to gang activities and suppression interventions. The more granular data on some of these variables, some of which does exist, was not publicly accessible. Finally, local and international law enforcement stakeholders were, in many instances, unable

to give specific information about gangs given the fact that there are ongoing related operations and investigation.

213 Content analysis is the analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect. Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 2004.

214 UNDP (2012).

215 Harriott and Jones (2016).

# Appendix II

## Sample of social interventions targeting gangs, directly and/or indirectly

The largest social intervention programme in Jamaica is the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), an initiative overseen by the Ministry of National Security, and funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) (Canada). The programme targets volatile communities with the stated aims to prevent and reduce crime and violence, strengthen crime management capabilities, and improve the delivery of judicial services.<sup>216</sup> The programme works in many fields with other actors and stakeholders, such as community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other state entities. The programme has been renewed twice: CSJP I 2002-2008, CSJP II 2009-2013, and CSJP III 2014-2020.

One of the CSJP's flagship anti-violence programmes is the Peace Management Initiative (PMI). The PMI was created in 2002 by the Ministry of National Security to employ “alternative ways to tackle violence that would avoid the bloodshed associated with harsh police repression.” It considers itself an independent entity, and is very much like an NGO in many respects.<sup>217</sup> The organization works on its own, but more often its activities are carried out as one member of a large-scale collaborative agreement among multiple public and private institutions.<sup>218</sup> The organisation collaborates with, among other entities, the Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA).<sup>219</sup>

The PMI's main objective is to interrupt the cycle of revenge that tends to follow an act of violence between rival gangs using mediation, and working with groups of youths. The interventions seek not to end the violence per se, but rather to manage it, limiting its intensity and reducing harm, and so require working directly with perpetrators of violence, and responding immediately to crises, such as a gang killing.<sup>220</sup> PMI engages in a range of interventions, projects, and activities, all aimed, whether directly or indirectly, at ending violence and promoting peace. The three main PMI interventions are (1) violence interruption, (2) mediation, (these are both direct,) and (3) efforts to provide alternatives to gang life (indirect interventions.)

For its founders, principals, and supporters, the PMI is an outstanding example of effective violence intervention, with an overall impact of an acceptance of the peace objective and the beginnings of a peace-building climate in a wide range of communities.<sup>221</sup> PMI has been formally evaluated twice, in 2006 and in 2009; neither was an impact evaluation, though both attempted, in different ways, to estimate the project's effects. The 2009 assessment found that “PMI is widely credited by interviewees with stopping the wars in August Town, Brown's Town, and Mountain View - a very significant achievement. They are viewed by the different sections of the communities as having a neutral face and thus trusted to initiate dialogue which strengthens trust.”<sup>222</sup>

A more recent study concluded that the

Peace Management Initiative approach reduced homicides by 97% over a five-year intervention period in a violent inner-city neighbourhood in Kingston. The study acknowledged that the research design did not control for any other confounding factors that might have influenced violence apart from the intervention, nor was there a control comparator community which had no intervention, which placed constraints on accounting for the findings solely to the work of PMI.<sup>223</sup> Another study found that “there are clear indications that PMI, along with other actors, contributed to reducing the wave of violence in some communities, even though no rigorous impact evaluation was ever carried out, in part because none was planned, and in part due to the technical difficulty of doing so.” These evaluations, as well as other studies, account for the possibility that in areas where there has been a decrease in violence concomitant with PMI's work, other factors may have contributed, such as police activity, or the parallel presence of other interventions. There is also the methodological problem known as “regression to the mean,” where after a crisis it is likely that homicides will drop, not necessarily as a result of the intervention but simply as a result of the exceptional nature of the circumstances that led to that critical point. So there is a risk that part of this natural decline will be attributed, in an overly optimistic manner, to the project itself. Further, declines in homicides in areas where the project has been implemented have not always been permanent. Thus there is agreement that there is no definitive proof of PMI's im-

216 MNS - Citizen Security and Justice Programme I (2008).

217 Ignacio Cano and Emiliano Rojido, “Mapping of Homicide Prevention Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Laboratório de Análise da Violência Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, September 2016, <http://homicidioslatam.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/OPENHOMICMAPPING-REPORT-english-final.pdf>, 111.

218 Cano and Rojido, 114.

219 VPA is an umbrella organisation that was originally launched by the World Health Organization, and established in Jamaica in 2004. Its objective is to exchange violence prevention information between organisations, and to monitor programmes. Like many such organizations in Jamaica their work is fore-stalled by funding shortages.

pact, but that there are indications that “point in the right direction.”<sup>224</sup>

Another key CSJP-supported anti-violence intervention, which is directly related to gangs, is the Violence Interruption Programme (VIP). A qualitative examination of the contribution of the VIP to changes in trends and patterns of violence in CSJP and VIP communities in St. James (in western Jamaica) found that despite their limited reach, and the view of target youth that they were not core violence relief actors (the security forces were,) when the violence interrupters and CSJP community case management officers are combined effectively, they “guarantee youth the greatest ontological security.” The Violence Interrupters (VIs), according to the study, reached gunmen, slowed those approaching the decision to become killers, and kept violent youth emotionally stable. The study enumerated instances where VIs brokered peace between warring gangs and brought an end to violence in a community after horrific gang murders.<sup>225</sup>

The donor-funded iteration of CSJP is scheduled to end in December 2020, with the expectation that there will be a transition to GOJ-funded set of interventions, some which will be carried over from the CSJP.

The third phase of the programme, which began in December 2014, tabled among its achievements the training of 167 parent trainers and 189 parents; providing counselling interventions for 2,090 beneficiaries; conducting 612 outreach activities with 45,025 at-risk youth; implementation of a case management system and social marketing campaigns; implementation of seven situational crime-prevention projects; vocational skills training

for 1,549 participants; tuition support for 1,128 secondary students and 894 tertiary students; and on-the-job training for 978 persons. These achievements all directly address some of the basic elements of preventing youth from joining gangs, which is to strengthen communities, families, and schools; improve community supervision; train teachers and parents to manage disruptive youth; and teach students interpersonal skills.<sup>227</sup>

In the JCF’s view, “the literature is replete with information concerning the many reasons youth join gangs, including: for money, a sense of support and belonging, status, a perceived sense of protection, or to exhibit an outlaw mentality. Multiple strategies are needed to lessen these attractions.”<sup>228</sup> The JCF lists its own anti-gang prevention and intervention initiatives as school sensitizations “which seek to enhance prevention and diversion efforts, and inform the youths... of the signs and likely consequences of gang involvement”; the Proactive Violence Interruption Strategy (PVIS);<sup>229</sup> the Safe Schools Programme through the School Resource Officers;<sup>230</sup> and the greater use of Neighbourhood Watch, Farmers’ Watch, and Business Watch, which the JCF considers important vehicles through which gang violence can be disrupted, prevented, and diverted.”<sup>231</sup>

The Proactive Violence Interruption Strategy (PVIS) is a partnership between the JCF and families that have been directly impacted by violence. The JCF Chaplaincy Services Branch, the Criminal Investigation Branch, and the Community Safety and Security Branch, volunteer chaplains, the Family Liaison Officer, and family members and associates of a person who died as a result of violence, meet immediately after the incident to reassure

the aggrieved parties that the police will do everything within their power to bring the offender(s) to justice. The objective is to lessen the need for any act of violence in retaliation of the harm done, and to bring about a sense of healing and care to the family that suffered hurt. This is in a context of approximately 60% of all murders in Jamaica for 2013 having been the result of reprisal attacks.<sup>232</sup>

The Safe Schools Programme was established in 2004; it aims to tackle criminal and anti-social behaviour in schools, and seeks to promote discipline and positive values. It is a joint initiative of the ministries of National Security, Health, Education, and Youth, and several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and up to 2014 had implemented in 174 schools across the island. Under the programme, specially trained members of the JCF, called school resource officers, are deployed to targeted schools across the island, where they work with students deemed at risk. There are anecdotal accounts of change in behaviour patterns in students, which has been attributed to the programme. Mentorship is also an aspect of the programme, where police officers and other “key persons in the wider society” are mentors for some of the students who are identified as delinquents or displaying certain anti-social behaviour. Other aspects of the programme are training of guidance counsellors, deans of discipline, and members of the student council body to act as mentors; sports; and a “safe schools tour,” where music, dub poetry, and performance, was used to further engagement between students and the police officers.<sup>233</sup>

There are other initiatives being carried out by the GOJ, whether through the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry

of National Security, or other GOJ ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) that could be considered anti-gang interventions, in that they target unattached young people, mainly males, who are particularly vulnerable to joining gangs.

The Housing, Opportunity, Production and Employment (HOPE) Programme is, in part, a training and apprenticeship programme, through the National Service Corps. The programme targets unattached youth 18 - 24 years old, “who are not engaged in any meaningful way.” An associated programme is Learning, Earning, Giving, Saving (LEGS), to provide these youth the opportunity to “work to learn, work to earn, work to give service to the nation and work to save for their future.”<sup>234</sup> The extent to which either of these programmes are modeled after evidence-informed protocols, or if they are systematically evaluated, is not known.

The Holness administration has repeatedly stated its commitment to the development of uniformed groups in high schools. The Jamaica Combined Cadet Corps is the main uniformed group that is garnering public funding. The objectives of this initiative are to “instil positive values and attitudes in the youth and steer them away from negative influences,”<sup>235</sup> “develop the character of young Jamaicans,” “give more young men and

women the opportunity to actively participate in nation-building,” and to provide a “counterweight to the ‘attractions and distractions’ that are competing for the attention of young people.” In 2019 it was announced that the GOJ plans to establish cadet corps in all high schools across the country by the end of F/Y 2021.<sup>236</sup>

The most recent announcement regarding anti-violence interventions was from the Ministry of National Security: a one-year strategic social-intervention pilot project in select communities, aimed at reducing crime and violence, particularly those perpetrated by youth. This project will identify a cohort of students deemed to be “at risk,” from schools that are prone to gang violence and recruitment, in targeted communities. A key feature of this approach is the focus on a younger cohort than previous approaches which targeted the 17 - 29 age group. This intervention will target younger children, which, the MNS said, research has shown to be a better cohort for such efforts, and so will focus on “primary students who are from ‘feeder schools,’ matriculating to high schools in the targeted communities where a large number of gangs operate.”<sup>237</sup>

To target children younger than the cohort that are already labeled “unattached”

or “vulnerable,” is an idea supported by evidence-informed research, and by Jamaican stakeholders and experts. Yet there is a vulnerable population that exists prior to eight and after 15 years, and no age group should be excluded because of the inclusion of another. For example, it is recognized that gangs recruit from among high school students. A 2018 JCF report showed that there was a 65% increase in the number of children arrested for firearms between 2016 and 2017, the majority of whom were 15-17 years old, and were from the parishes where gangs are prevalent (Kingston and St. Andrew.)<sup>238</sup>

There is also a need for such interventions to be gender-aware. Though most gang members are male, interventions that only target boys will miss the needs of girls who are predominantly the victims of sexual assault and/or intimate partner violence, which are exacerbated in violent situations where gangs are prevalent, and who are likely to have unplanned pregnancies. The exclusion of persons from prevention and intervention policies of any age or gender, will undoubtedly render less effective any attempt to disrupt the cycle of crime and violence, and maladaptive development.

224 Cano and Rojido, 121.

225 Herbert Gayle, “Ministry of National Security Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP) III. 2018 Evaluation of the Violence Interruption Programme,” PowerPoint presentation, November, 2018.

226 “Crime Prevention to Get Big Boost with \$1.4b Allocation to the CSJP,” Loop, February 21, 2019, [www.loopjamaica.com/content/crime-prevention-get-big-boost-14b-allocation-csjp](http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/crime-prevention-get-big-boost-14b-allocation-csjp).

227 James Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs,” Juvenile Justice Bulletin, [www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojdp/231116.pdf).

228 JCF, “Gang Violence in Jamaica.”

229 “Proactive Violence Interruption Strategy,” <https://sites.google.com/site/csbpvvis/>.

230 Athaliah Reynolds-Baker, “Safe schools programme having positive impact on children,” Jamaica Information Service, February 18, 2014, <https://jis.gov.jm/safe-schools-programme-positive-impact-students/>

231 JCF (2017), 12.

232 “Proactive Violence Interruption Strategy.”

233 Reynolds-Baker.

234 “Housing, Opportunity, Production, and Employment (HOPE) Programme,” Social Development Commission n.d., <https://sdc.gov.jm/housing-opportunity-production-and-employment-hope-programme/>

235 “More cadet units to be established in schools,” Jamaica Combined Cadet Force, <http://cadetforceja.org/content/more-cadet-units-be-established-schools>

236 Okoye Henry, “Cadet Corps to be Established in all High School,” Jamaica Information Service, November 4, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/cadet-corps-to-be-established-in-all-high-schools/>

237 Rosheika Grant, “National Security Ministry to Implement Social Intervention Pilot Project,” Jamaica Information Service, October 10, 2019, <https://jis.gov.jm/national-security-ministry-to-implement-social-intervention-pilot-project/>.

238 JCF (2018) cited in Lewis, McIntosh and Perkins (2019), 97.

Notes

## Guns Out: The Splintering of Jamaica's Gangs

---

To read any of our published reports in full,  
please visit  
[www.capricaribbean.org/reports](http://www.capricaribbean.org/reports)

Contact us at:  
[info@capricaribbean.org](mailto:info@capricaribbean.org)  
or by telephone at  
(876) 970-3447 or (876) 970-2910



**CARIBBEAN  
POLICY  
RESEARCH  
INSTITUTE**